NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 55

TO:	The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT:	Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations

              I wish to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows with regard
to my views of their relations to me in Cold War Operations:

    a.  I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military
advisor responsible both for initiating advice to me and for res-
ponding to requests for advice. I expect their advice to come to
me direct and unfiltered.

    b.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense
of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in con-
ventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary
forces and resources available to the Department of Defense, verify their
readiness, report on their accuracy, and make appropriate recommen-
dations for their expansion and improvement. I look to the Chiefs to
contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the
success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War programs.

    c.  I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military view-
point in governmental councils in such a way as to assure that the
military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached.
When only the Chairman or a single Chief is present, that officer
must represent the Chiefs as a body, taking such preliminary and
subsequent actions as may be necessary to assure that he does in
fact represent the corporate judgement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.












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    d.  While I look to the Chiefs to represent the military factor with-
out reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men
and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the over-all
context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in
Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.

[signature of John Kennedy]                      

 

cc:	Secretary of Defense General Taylor

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 56

TO:	The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT:	Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements

The President has approved the following paragraph:

"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future
requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and
paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory
the paramilitary assests we have in the United States Armed
Forces, consider various areas in the world where the
implementation of our policy may require indigenous para-
military forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the
goals which we should set in this field. Having determined
the assets and the possible requirements, it would then be-
come a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit."

The President requests that the Secretary of Defense, in coordina-
tion with the Department of State and the CIA, make such an
estimate of requirements and recommend ways and means to meet
these requirements.

McGeorge Bundy                      

 

cc:	Secretary of State Director, CIA General Maxwell D. Taylor

C-O-P-Y          

TO:	The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, CIA

The President has approved the attached recommendation:

The Special Group (5412 Committee) will perform the functions
assigned in the recommendation to the Strategic Resources
Group.

McGeorge Bundy                           

  cc:   General Maxwell D. Taylor

 

cc:	Mrs. Lincoln Mr. Smith Mr. McG. Bundy file

          RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

          1.  For the purpose of this study, a paramilitary operation is
considered to be one which by its tactics and its requirements in
military-type personnel, equipment and training approximates a con-
ventional military operation. It may be undertaken in support of an
existing government friendly to the U.S. or in support of a rebel group
seeking to overthrow a government hostile to us. The U.S. may render
assistance to such operations overtly, covertly or by a combination of
both methods. In size these operations may vary from the infiltration
of a squad of guerillas to a military operation such as the Cuban invasion.
The small operations will often fall completely within the normal capa-
bility of one agency; the large ones may affect State, Defense, CIA, USIA
and possibly other departments and agencies.

          2.  In order to conduct paramilitary operations with maximum effec-
tiveness and flexibility within the context of the Cold War, it is recommended
that current directives and procedures be modified to effect the following:

       a.  Any proposed paramilitary operation in the concept state
will be presented to the Strategic Resources Group for initial con-
sidertation and for approval as necessary by the President. There-
after, the SRG will assign primary responsibility for planning, for
interdepartment coordination and for execution to the Task Force,
department or individual best qualified to carry forward the operation
to success, and will indicate supporting responsibilities. Under
this principle, the Department of Defense will normally receive
responsibility for overt paramilitary operations. Where such an
operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned
to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the
agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert
which requires significant numbers of military trained personnel,
amounts to military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled
stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the
Armed services is properly the primary responsibility of the
Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.