Preface

groves of Gothic spires on the roof of St. Patrick's Cathedral, the company's president, Winthrop Knowlton, announced that Cord Meyer, Jr., a senior CIA official, had recently visited Harper's owner and president emeritus, Cass Canfield, Sr., apparently an old friend from New York social circles. Claiming that my book represented a threat to national security, the CIA had asked Harper's owner to suppress it. To his credit, Canfield had refused. But he had agreed to allow the CIA to review the manuscript prior to publication. Although Knowlton argued forcefully in favor of the CIA review, I resisted the idea and withheld my approval.

A month later Knowlton gave me an ultimatum: If I did not agree to a CIA review of the manuscript, Harper & Row, contract notwithstanding, would refuse to publish my book. I spent almost twenty-four hours struggling with the dilemma. My friend David Obst, a freelance literary agent in Washington, put me in touch with Hal Dutton of the publishing house E. P. Dutton, who was, David said, very upset by Harper's decision to grant the CIA prior review of any manuscript. Dutton was willing to publish the book but warned that editorial work and legal battles with Harper & Row could mean a delay of six months.

Rather than slow the publication of timely material, I worked out a compromise with Harper & Row. We created a procedure for submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review in a way that would preserve some semblance of editorial integrity.

Tipped off to a potential story by our mutual friend David Obst, Seymour Hersh, recently hired as an investigative reporter for The New York Times, interviewed Harper's staff and published his exposé of the CIA's attempt to suppress the book on page 1 of the The New York Times. Over the next week, The Washington Post ran an editorial attacking the CIA's infringement of freedom of the press and NBC's Chronolog program televised an hour-long report by Garrick Utley on the agency's complicity in the Laotian drug trade.

Faced with a barrage of negative media exposure, the CIA studied my manuscript for a week before delivering a review full of undocumented and unconvincing denials. It was a dishonest document, indicating that Harper & Row's trust in the agency's integrity had been ill advised. For example, to counter my thesis that the CIA's alliance with Nationalist Chinese irregulars in Burma had expanded local opium production, the CIA simply denied that the Chinese irregulars had been involved in drug dealing. But only five months before, the CIA had spent nearly $2 million to buy and burn the "last" 26 tons of opium that its Chinese clients had hauled out of northern Burma.