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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Oversight of Underground Piping Systems Commensurate with Risk, but Proactive Measures Could Help Address Future Leaks

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What GAO Found

While experts in our public health discussion group generally agreed that radioactive leaks at the three nuclear power plants in our case studies of actual events had no discernible impact on the public’s health, these experts noted that additional information could enhance the identification of the leaks and the characterization of their impacts. The experts in our environmental impact discussion group concluded that environmental resources beyond the plant site have not been impacted discernibly, but that on-site contamination could affect plant decommissioning; for example, the licensee may have to conduct costly remediation to meet NRC regulations for unrestricted release of the site. Experts also identified the need for licensees to transparently report monitoring data and for licensees’ groundwater monitoring programs to be independently reviewed.

NRC inspection requirements focus on ensuring the functionality of underground piping systems that are essential for both the safe operation and the shutdown of plants rather than providing information about the condition of the underground piping systems. In addition, NRC’s groundwater monitoring requirements generally focus on monitoring off-site locations, where a member of the public could be exposed to radiation, but not on onsite groundwater monitoring, which can improve the likelihood that leaks will be detected before they migrate off-site.

In response to leaks, the nuclear power industry has implemented two voluntary initiatives to increase public confidence in plant safety. The first initiative was intended to improve on-site groundwater monitoring to promptly detect leaks. The second was intended to provide reasonable assurance of underground piping systems’ structural and leaktight integrity. Licensees’ responses to detected leaks have varied, ranging from repairing the leak source and documenting the leak’s extent, to performing extensive mitigation. In addition, NRC has assessed its regulatory framework for, and oversight of, inspection of underground piping systems and groundwater monitoring. Based on the low risk posed by spills to date, NRC determined that no further regulations are needed at this time but has committed to such actions as gathering information on underground piping leak trends and reviewing codes and standards for underground piping.

Key stakeholders identified additional NRC requirements that they thought could help prevent, detect, and disclose leaks. Some saw a need for NRC to require licensees to inspect the structural integrity of underground piping using techniques used in the oil and gas industry, while noting the challenges to applying such techniques at nuclear power plants. Industry is undertaking research to overcome these challenges. Stakeholders also noted that NRC should enhance its on-site groundwater monitoring requirements to promptly detect leaks and minimize their impacts. Finally, stakeholders said that NRC should require licensees to provide leak information in a more timely fashion and should make that information more accessible to the public.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AOG</td>
<td>Advanced Off-Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASME</td>
<td>American Society of Mechanical Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWR</td>
<td>Boiling Water Reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cfs</td>
<td>cubic feet per second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESW</td>
<td>Emergency Service Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fe-55</td>
<td>Iron-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPM</td>
<td>gallons per minute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kg/yr</td>
<td>kilograms per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/yr</td>
<td>Liters per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>minimum detectable activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mrem</td>
<td>millirem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mrem/yr</td>
<td>millirem per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWt</td>
<td>megawatts-thermal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ni-63</td>
<td>Nickel-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPDES</td>
<td>National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pCi/L</td>
<td>picocuries per liter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEI</td>
<td>Nuclear Energy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCGS</td>
<td>Oyster Creek Generating Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWR</td>
<td>Pressurized Water Reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr-90</td>
<td>Strontium-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te-99</td>
<td>Technetium-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernon Dam</td>
<td>Vernon Hydroelectric Dam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VYNPS</td>
<td>Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
June 3, 2011

The Honorable Edward Markey
The Honorable Peter Welch
House of Representatives

In recent years, a number of nuclear power plants have experienced leaks of radioactive materials from pipe systems that are underground and not easily accessible. Many of these underground pipe leaks resulted in contamination of groundwater by tritium—a radioactive form of hydrogen. In some instances, the contamination has migrated, or is expected to migrate, beyond the plant's boundaries, raising concerns about potential impacts on public health and the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent federal agency headed by five commissioners, licenses commercial nuclear power plants and regulates and oversees their safe operation and security. NRC’s mission includes protecting public health and the environment from radiation hazards.

Most nuclear power plants have extensive underground piping systems, some of which transport water containing radioactive isotopes, such as tritium. While the amount and type of underground piping systems vary significantly among nuclear power plants, according to NRC officials, most of these underground systems are not safety-related—that is, they are not necessary to ensure reactor integrity, shut down and safely maintain the reactor, or prevent or mitigate the public’s exposure to radiation during an accident. As nuclear power plants age, their underground piping systems tend to corrode, but since these systems are largely inaccessible and difficult to inspect, the condition of many underground piping systems at plants across the country is unknown. Further, as pipes continue to age and further corrosion occurs, the likelihood and severity of leaks could increase without mitigating actions.

For the purposes of this report, the term “underground piping systems” includes what NRC defines as: (1) buried piping—piping that is underground and in contact with soil or encased in concrete and (2) underground piping—piping that is below the ground’s surface but encased within a tunnel or a vault such that it is in contact with air and located where access for inspection is restricted. In addition, the term includes all piping system components, such as joints and valves, as some of these components have also been the source of reported leaks.
In the past decade, increased reports of buried pipe leaks at nuclear power plants have attracted significant attention and generated public concern about NRC’s oversight of underground piping systems, particularly since NRC has issued few violations in association with these leaks.\textsuperscript{2} Specifically, stakeholders—such as environmental and antinuclear groups, as well as some scientists and engineers—have questioned the adequacy of NRC requirements pertaining to the safety of underground piping systems and are also seeking to understand the factors responsible for underground piping system leaks. Some stakeholders also have concerns about NRC’s license renewal process. As most aging power plants have been applying for—and receiving—20-year extensions of their operating licenses, some stakeholders have filed contentions, including contentions to prevent the relicensing of some plants with underground piping systems that may be subject to leaks.\textsuperscript{3}

In this context, you asked us to review underground piping systems and NRC’s requirements for them. Our objectives were to (1) determine experts’ opinions on the impacts, if any, that underground piping system leaks have had on public health and the environment; (2) assess NRC requirements of licensees for inspecting underground piping systems and monitoring and reporting on leaks from these systems; (3) identify actions the nuclear power industry, licensees, and NRC have taken in response to underground piping system leaks; and (4) identify, according to key stakeholders, what additional NRC requirements, if any, could help prevent, detect, and disclose leaks from underground piping systems.

To address these objectives, we consulted with experts, analyzed documents, conducted visits to selected plant sites and NRC regional offices, and interviewed stakeholders. Specifically, we worked with the National Academy of Sciences to convene two groups of six experts each,\textsuperscript{4} in January 2011. The first group addressed the public health impacts of underground piping system leaks, and the second one addressed their environmental impacts. We asked both groups of experts to discuss the impacts of leaks in the context of three case studies of nuclear power

\textsuperscript{2}These violations were issued due to licensees’ failure to properly evaluate the radiological consequences of the leaks.

\textsuperscript{3}Contentions are petitions filed by stakeholders during the NRC licensing process opposing a license application as submitted. 10 C.F.R. Part 2 contains NRC’s regulations on licensing proceedings.

\textsuperscript{4}Two experts served on both groups.
plants that have experienced leaks in their underground piping systems: Braidwood Generating Station in Illinois, Oyster Creek Generating Station in New Jersey, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vermont. We selected these case studies because they included plants with underground piping system leaks that generated significant publicity and resulted in high concentrations of tritium detected in on-site groundwater. Additionally, the case studies included a plant at which contamination from a leak was detected off-site (Braidwood). We also analyzed relevant NRC regulations and requirements and interviewed NRC officials from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office of General Counsel, Region I, and Region III. In addition, we selected a nonprobability sample of seven nuclear power plants, most of which had recently experienced an underground piping system leak, and one of which had not experienced a publicized pipe leak, and made site visits to these locations to interview licensee representatives and NRC resident inspectors. During the site visits, we also observed ongoing activities related to mitigation of leaks. Finally, using a standard set of questions, we interviewed a nonprobability sample of over 30 stakeholders including representatives from NRC, other federal and state agencies who have worked on issues related to underground piping system leaks and associated groundwater contamination, representatives from industry and industry groups, standards-setting organizations, and advocacy and other interested groups, as well as independent consultants and experts. A more detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology is presented in appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to June 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

See appendix II for additional information on the case study power plant sites considered by the experts.

Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because, in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
Currently 104 commercial nuclear power plants operate in the United States, together generating, as of 2007, about 20 percent of our nation’s electricity. These reactors are located at 65 sites across the country (see fig. 1) and are operated by 26 different companies. Many reactors built in the late 1960s and early 1970s are reaching or have reached the end of their initial 40-year license. As of March 2011, NRC had renewed 63 reactor licenses for an additional 20 years and was currently reviewing 19 license renewal applications.

Figure 1: U.S. Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of commercial operation by the end of 2010</th>
<th>Number of reactors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NRC (data); Map Resources (map).
Since 2008, NRC has been collecting data from licensees on groundwater contamination incidents at nuclear power plants that have resulted from unplanned or uncontrolled releases of radioactive material, including leaks from underground piping systems. Based on these data, NRC has concluded that all 65 reactor sites in the United States have experienced a leak or spill of radioactive material into groundwater. NRC estimates that between 10 and 20 percent of groundwater contamination events at nuclear power plants can be attributed to leaks from underground piping systems. Figure 2 provides a diagram of a hypothetical underground piping system leak at a nuclear power plant. In addition, NRC data suggest that groundwater contamination events have been more prevalent during the last several years; however, the agency attributes this apparent increase to the nuclear industry’s enhanced monitoring efforts and increased reporting of leaks during the same time period.

Other common sources of leaks that have resulted in groundwater contamination include spent fuel pools, outside storage tanks—such as condensate storage tanks and radioactive waste storage tanks—sumps, and vaults.
NRC strives to accomplish its mission of protecting public health and safety and the environment by establishing regulations and standards governing licensed activities and inspecting facilities to ensure compliance with requirements. NRC prioritizes its oversight and inspections of structures, systems, and components that are critical to safely operating the plant during normal conditions and safely cooling the reactor core in the case of an emergency shutdown. Therefore, these structures, systems, and components are classified by NRC as “safety-related.”

NRC maintains staff at commercial nuclear power plants to inspect, measure, and assess their safety performance—and respond to any deficiency in performance—through its Reactor Oversight Process. Furthermore, according to NRC inspection protocols, performance deficiencies by the company licensed to operate a nuclear power plant, or licensee, can result in more intensive NRC oversight and/or issuance of a violation. However, to assure licensees that requirements placed on them will change only when they are justified from a public health and safety
standpoint, the “backfit rule” requires that NRC make the determination that new requirements will result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of public health and safety and that this increased protection justifies the cost of implementing the new requirement.

NRC’s regulations allow certain levels of radioactive materials to be discharged into the environment. As a part of its license application, a licensee performs calculations of its expected releases, and NRC reviews these calculations to verify their validity and conformance to NRC requirements. NRC’s review and verification are documented in reports, and the licensees are required to monitor their discharges. Most of the systems used to discharge these radioactive materials are not classified as “safety-related.” According to NRC officials, the amount of radioactive materials released from underground piping system leaks has been small relative to these permitted discharges. Furthermore, the officials noted that a leak of tritium in and of itself is not a violation of NRC requirements.

NRC has established several layers of radiation standards to protect the public against potential health risks from exposure to radioactive releases from nuclear power plant operations (see table 1). In addition to these standards, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed drinking water standards for radioactive isotopes using its authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act. These limits apply to public drinking water systems but are also used by many state authorities as groundwater protection standards. For tritium, EPA set a maximum contaminant level

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8 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(1) defines a backfit as "the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility; any of which may result from a new or amended provision in the Commission’s regulations or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission’s regulations that is either new or different from a previously applicable staff position."

9 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3). The backfit rule does not apply when NRC finds that regulatory action is necessary to ensure that protection of public health and safety is adequate. 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(4). In addition, NRC officials told us that the backfit rule applies only to requirements on currently licensed facilities and that additional requirements can be placed on new licensees without requiring a backfit analysis.

10 The NRC obtains a copy of the licensee’s Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, which contains the licensee’s calculation methodology.

11 NRC’s Safety Evaluation Report documenting their review and an Environmental Impact Statement as required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
of 20,000 picocuries per liter (pCi/l). \(^\text{12}\) None of the reported underground piping system leaks to date have exceeded NRC limits on the public’s exposure to radiation, nor have reported concentrations of radioactive materials in off-site groundwater exceeded EPA standards for drinking water.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation protection layer</th>
<th>Annual dose limit</th>
<th>Basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As low as reasonably achievable dose objective for liquid releases *</td>
<td>3 millirem (mrem) (^\text{a}) to the whole body and 10 mrem to any organ of an individual who lives in close proximity to the plant boundary</td>
<td>A fraction of the natural background radiation dose, and an attainable objective that nuclear power plants could reasonably meet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA radiation standards incorporated as NRC regulations *</td>
<td>25 mrem to the whole body, 75 mrem to the thyroid, and 25 mrem to any other organ of an individual member of the public</td>
<td>Limit is cost-effective in reducing potential health risks from nuclear power generation facilities’ operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC dose limit *</td>
<td>100 mrem to any individual members of the public</td>
<td>International Commission on Radiological Protection’s recommendation that a lifetime of exposure at this limit would result in a very small health risk and is roughly equivalent to background radiation from natural sources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NRC.

* 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. I.

* A millirem is a unit for measuring biological damage from radiation.

* 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301(e).

* 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301(a)(1).

* The International Commission on Radiological Protection is an organization of international radiation scientists who provide recommendations regarding radiation protection related activities, including dose limits.

When unplanned releases do not exceed NRC dose limits, NRC requirements allow for licensees to remediate the residual radioactivity at the time the site is decommissioned. For a decommissioned nuclear power plant site to be released for unrestricted use, NRC requires that it be cleaned up to an established minimum radiation annual dose limit. In addition to this requirement, NRC has entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with EPA on cleanup of radioactively contaminated

\(^\text{12}\) A curie is a measure of radioactivity; a picocurie is one trillionth of a curie.
sites. The MOU includes provisions for NRC to consult with EPA if a site meets NRC cleanup standards but exceeds EPA-permitted levels.\footnote{NRC and EPA use different methods to calculate radiation standards.}

According to the experts in our public health discussion group, no impacts on public health have been discernible from leaks at the three case study nuclear power plants we asked the experts to consider. Experts in our environmental expert group also said that no impacts from these leaks on off-site environmental resources have been discernible to date but that the on-site impacts over time are less certain. Finally, experts in both groups believe that additional information could help facilitate the identification of any future leaks and characterize their impacts.

Radioactive leaks at three power plants in Illinois, New Jersey, and Vermont have had no discernible impact on the public’s health, according to the participants in our expert discussion group on the public health impacts of the leaks. More specifically, although the experts observed that the risk of impacts to the public’s health is not zero, it is immeasurably small. While tritium was detected in the on-site groundwater at each of these plants from one or more leaks, it was detected in an off-site drinking water well only in the case of the Illinois plant. The experts noted that, based on the information reported by the licensees and NRC on off-site contamination levels, the radiation doses to the public from leaks at these plants have been very low—well below NRC regulations for radiation exposure, and orders of magnitude below any exposure that could cause an observable health effect.

According to the experts in our public health discussion group, leaks at three nuclear power plants have had no discernible impact on public health or the environment, but more information could enhance identification of leaks and characterization of their impacts.
While the experts concluded that leaks at these plants have not discernibly impacted the public’s health, some of them noted that the leaks may affect people in the surrounding communities in a less tangible manner. For example, according to two of the experts, even if community members have not been exposed to radiation from the leaks, the perception that contamination could exist in their community or that they cannot trust the operators of a nearby nuclear power plant can degrade individuals’ quality of life. In addition, another expert noted that reported leaks at nuclear power plants could have an impact on the property values in the surrounding community based on the perception that the leaks could impact public health. Some of the experts observed that such perceptions are not taken into account in NRC’s regulatory framework, which is based on protecting public health and safety. However, they noted that, for NRC or licensees to build trust and gain credibility, they should consider these perceived impacts when determining their actions to address a leak. A few experts said that better communication and complete transparency with the public about the risks associated with very low doses of radiation would be required to change the public’s perception of the impacts associated with the leaks. However, one expert acknowledged the difficulty in effectively communicating the complex issue of risks to the public posed by low doses of radiation. Another expert suggested that communication with the public may be more effective if it is done through someone outside of industry with higher credibility from the community’s perspective. 

No Impacts on Off-site Environmental Resources from Leaks at the Three Plants to Date Have Been Discernible, but Future On-site Impacts Are Less Certain, and Some Risks May Not Be Fully Understood, according to Experts in Our Environmental Impacts Discussion Group

Based on the information that is available on the case studies considered by the experts, the experts in our environmental impacts discussion group concluded that the leaks have had no discernible impact on off-site environmental resources. The experts noted that the leaks are unlikely to have an environmental impact if they do not affect public health, since humans are probably more sensitive to the effects of tritium contamination than most other organisms. However, two experts noted that very little information exists on the sensitivity of other organisms to impacts from environmental tritium contamination. Consequently, subtle effects on other organisms that have not been identified could exist.

A few experts pointed out that even though off-site environmental impacts are not discernible, the on-site groundwater contamination from the leaks may have degraded the on-site environment, potentially limiting the site’s future use. The on-site groundwater tritium contamination resulting from two of the case study leaks was detected in concentrations over 100 times the EPA drinking water standard. Consequently, some of the experts noted
that when a licensee decommissions a plant with this level of groundwater contamination, the licensee may have to conduct costly remediation to be able to meet NRC regulations for unrestricted release of the site, or the site could have deed restrictions placed on its future use. Some of the experts debated whether the time frames for decommissioning current nuclear power plant sites would be sufficient for existing tritium contamination to naturally decay to levels required for unrestricted release of the site. \(^\text{14}\) Regardless, one of the experts noted that the licensees and NRC need to monitor high levels of current on-site contamination and ensure it does not move off-site in the future.

**Experts in Both of Our Groups Said That Additional Information Could Help Facilitate the Timely Detection of Leaks and Characterize Their Impacts, and Experts Identified the Need for More Transparency and Independent Review of Information**

According to the experts in both of our discussion groups, to facilitate the detection of leaks in a timely manner, it is important that licensees have a thorough understanding of the site’s subsurface environment and identify risk areas. NRC requires characterization of a site’s hydrogeology—the groundwater and other subsurface characteristics—as a part of the evaluation process to choose an appropriate site for construction of the nuclear power plant. However, one expert pointed out that any construction on-site can significantly modify how groundwater flows through the subsurface, so it is very important to have current knowledge of a site’s hydrogeology. In addition, experts also said that it was very important for licensees to have knowledge of their underground infrastructure and to identify critical systems, structures, and components where a leak might occur. This knowledge would enable licensees to strategically place their monitoring wells in order to have confidence that they will promptly detect leaks.

Additional information could help characterize the impacts of leaks, according to the experts. More specifically, the experts noted that industry currently lacks standardized data across nuclear power plants to characterize the impacts of leaks and that data used to inform assessments of risk are limited to the locations where samples are collected. Experts said that, to obtain a complete picture of a leak’s consequences, monitoring wells need to be placed in the proper locations, which must be informed by a thorough understanding of a site’s hydrogeologic characteristics. Finally, the experts noted that licensees need to have conservative models that can predict how contamination would move if a

\(^{14}\)According to NRC, the half-life of tritium is approximately 12.3 years, which means that the amount of tritium decreases by half every 12.3 years.
leak were to occur, how long it would take for contamination to migrate off-site or contaminate a drinking water well, and what impacts there might be to public health and the environment.

Finally, experts identified the need for licensees’ monitoring data and assessments of impacts to be more transparent and to be independently reviewed to provide greater public confidence in them. One expert noted that groundwater data collected voluntarily by the licensees should be part of their annual environmental reports. Another expert observed that the groundwater reports prepared voluntarily by industry typically oversimplify presented data. In addition, experts expressed concern that there is no process for an agency or third party to review licensees’ groundwater monitoring programs. For example, one expert observed that licensees, with their consultants, independently develop their voluntary groundwater monitoring programs, collect the data, and report the results without a formal opportunity for NRC or others to comment on the specifics of the programs such as the number, location, and depth of monitoring wells. Another expert noted that the results of licensees’ modeling of radiation doses to the public from a leak should also undergo an independent review. Such a review could assess whether a different conclusion might have been reached if, for example, monitoring wells were placed in a different location. This is important, according to one expert, because NRC relies on licensees to initially determine whether a leak presents a health risk.
NRC requires licensees to inspect the function of their safety-related underground piping systems, monitor the plant environs for radiation, and report releases in a timely manner.

NRC inspection requirements related to underground piping systems at all 104 U.S. nuclear power plants focus on ensuring the functionality of safety-related piping systems, monitoring the plant environs for radiation, and reporting planned and unplanned releases. Specifically, NRC requires licensees to periodically test a sample of safety-related piping. Pipes are designated as safety related if they are essential to safely operate the plant or safely shut it down in case of an emergency. NRC inspection regulations, through the adoption of applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code provisions, require licensees to perform only pressure tests or flow tests on their safety-related underground piping systems. The pressure test is used to determine if and to what extent pressure is being lost within a section of piping, while the flow test is designed to identify any reduction in flow volume. To pass these tests, the pipes must be able to transport fluids at or above a specified minimum pressure or flow rate, which can be accomplished even when pipes are leaking. According to NRC, the agency's primary concern is whether a system is providing enough water to maintain its functionality at one point in time, which is what the results of the pressure and flow tests indicate.

NRC regulations also require that licensees monitor the “plant environs” for radioactivity that may be released from normal plant operations, as well as from unplanned leakage such as leaks and spills, to ensure the protection of the public’s health and safety. NRC requires that licensees establish and implement a site-specific Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program to obtain data on measurable levels of radiation and radioactive materials in the environment. Consistent with NRC guidance for this required monitoring program, licensees conduct radiation monitoring at locations where a member of the public could be exposed to radiation to identify whether levels of off-site radiation exceed federal dose limits. For example, agency guidance recommends quarterly monitoring of off-site groundwater only if it is used as a direct source of drinking water or irrigation and is likely to be contaminated. The agency

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15NRC officials told us that the scope of inspection requirements has increased for plants operating beyond their original 40-year license.

16NRC requires design, testing, and inspection for piping systems in accordance with applicable sections of the ASME Code. The testing prescribed by the code is not necessarily capable of detecting smaller sized leaks.

17According to NRC, “plant environs” are the area within the perimeter of the plant site, but outside of the plant buildings and the reactor.
does not generally require that licensees monitor groundwater on-site if it is not used for drinking water. However, if a licensee’s monitoring program found radioactive materials off-site, additional on-site monitoring could be required. With on-site monitoring, future leaks and spills have a higher likelihood of being detected before contamination reaches the site boundaries. Even though NRC has not generally required licensees to have on-site groundwater monitoring wells, most plants have installed some on-site wells that could help detect and monitor leaks. Although some contamination has been found to migrate off-site, thus far, according to NRC, reported off-site contamination has not exceeded EPA drinking water standards or NRC radiation exposure limits.

In addition, NRC regulations require that planned and unplanned releases be reported to NRC by licensees in a timely manner. For example, each licensee must submit a written report to NRC within 30 days after learning of an inadvertent release above specified limits of radioactive materials, such as tritium. The licensee’s report must include a description of the extent of exposure of individuals to radiation and radioactive material. These NRC reporting requirements are in addition to their immediate notification of incidents requirements. Immediate notification, via an Emergency Notification System or telephone, is required for certain events or situations that may have caused or threatens to cause an individual to receive a high dose of radiation.

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18NRC requires licensees to monitor groundwater on-site if there have been known leaks or spills or if discharges are likely to affect groundwater or drinking water supplies.

19These reporting requirements for licensee events are contained in 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.2203, 50.73.

20Under 10 C.F.R. § 20.2202(a), a licensee must, with few exceptions, notify NRC immediately of an event involving a 24-hour dose for which an individual present would receive an intake of five times the annual limit.
In response to underground piping leaks at nuclear power plants, the nuclear power industry adopted two voluntary initiatives largely intended, according to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), to enhance public confidence in the operation and maintenance of their plants. The actions specified in these initiatives, according to NRC officials, are above and beyond NRC requirements. Groundwater incidents that occurred around the 2005 time frame led to the industry’s Groundwater Protection Initiative in 2007, which was intended to boost public confidence in the safe operation of the plants and to improve groundwater monitoring at nuclear power plant sites to promptly detect leaks. All licensees of operating commercial nuclear power plants in the United States have committed to the groundwater initiative and, in so doing, have agreed to perform a site hydrogeologic characterization and risk assessment, establish an on-site groundwater monitoring program, and establish a remediation protocol.

After 2007, additional underground piping leaks were reported, heightening public concern about the degradation of buried pipes at nuclear power plants. As a result, NEI announced another voluntary industry initiative in 2009. This second initiative—called the Buried Piping Integrity Initiative—was designed to provide reasonable assurance of structural and leaktight integrity of all buried pipes. All licensees of operating commercial nuclear power plants in the United States have committed to this initiative as well. The initiative defined a series of milestones for, among other things, assessing the condition of buried pipes and establishing a plan for managing them. Specifically, under this initiative, licensees agreed to rank their buried piping based on the likelihood and consequences of its failure and to develop an inspection plan using the results of the risk ranking, along with other factors, to prioritize the selection of locations at which they will inspect pipes. The initiative placed special emphasis on buried piping that is safety-related and/or contains radioactive material. In 2010, the Buried Piping Integrity Initiative was expanded to the Buried Piping/Underground Piping and Tanks Integrity Initiative to address additional structures. All of the licensees have also committed to implement the expanded initiative.

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21NEI is the policy organization of the nuclear energy and technologies industry.
22This initiative is implemented by NEI-07-07.
23This initiative is implemented by NEI-09-14.
Licensees’ actions in response to identified leaks at their power plants have varied, ranging from simply repairing the leak source and documenting the extent of the leak for future cleanup, to performing extensive mitigation. Specifically, at six of the seven sites we visited that had experienced underground piping system leaks, most of the licensees had identified and repaired the leak source and conducted remediation and/or monitoring of the groundwater contamination. For example, when we visited the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, the soil near the identified leak source had been excavated and removed by a radiological waste company hired by the licensee. In addition, at the Oyster Creek Generating Station in New Jersey, the licensee had undertaken a mitigation project to excavate some of its buried piping, either moving the pipes aboveground or placing them in vaults that can be monitored for leakage.

NRC’s response to underground piping leaks has taken various forms. First, NRC’s response to individual leaks has generally been an increase in oversight at the particular plant, and not issuance of a violation, because most of the leaks have not posed a safety risk. For example, after an April 2009 leak at Oyster Creek Generating Station, NRC sent out regional inspectors to review and evaluate the circumstances associated with the leak. At other power plants, NRC’s enhanced review has included overseeing some of the groundwater sampling activities that were performed to characterize leaks. In many of these instances, NRC relied upon split sampling—sending portions of some of the groundwater monitoring samples to a laboratory and comparing its analytical results with those obtained by the licensees’ laboratories for the same samples—to verify the licensees’ results.

Furthermore, NRC reviewed its oversight of buried piping and took actions on the basis of its review. In particular, in the fall of 2009, after several reported leaks from buried piping resulted in groundwater contamination and increased media coverage, NRC’s Chairman tasked the agency staff with reviewing activities NRC had taken related to buried pipe leaks. The resulting December 2009 report concluded that the agency’s regulations for the design, inspection, and maintenance of safety-related buried piping are adequate to ensure buried piping can perform its safety function. The report also identified a number of ongoing activities, such as conducting direct visual inspections of piping when a licensee

24SECY 09-0174.
excavates underground piping for the purpose of repair and replacements. In 2010, NRC developed a Buried Piping Action Plan under which it would collect a variety of information, including data on buried pipe system leaks; assess the implementation of the industry’s Buried Piping/Underground Piping and Tanks Integrity Initiative; participate in reviewing professional codes and standards for buried pipes; and, if warranted, develop responding regulatory actions.

In 2010, NRC actions also included revising its Aging Management Program guidance for licensees to manage the effects of aging on structures or components for license renewal. The revisions include more detailed and comprehensive guidance for preventing and mitigating corrosion of underground piping systems and inspecting them. In addition, NRC proposed requirements for additional groundwater surveys for decommissioning.

Moreover, in 2010 and 2011, NRC reviewed the extent to which the industry has implemented the Groundwater Protection Initiative but did not evaluate its effectiveness. During this review, NRC found that most plants have implemented most but not necessarily all steps outlined in the voluntary initiative. To insure full implementation of the initiative, NRC plans to continue observing the long-term implementation of this initiative through its Reactor Oversight Process. However, NRC has no plans to evaluate the extent to which this initiative, as implemented, will promptly detect leaks and, as a result, has no assurance that the Groundwater Protection Initiative will consistently help to promptly detect leaks as nuclear power plants age. In addition, NRC officials have said they will continue to review the status of the initiative’s implementation, but said that the agency is not going to incorporate the initiative into its requirements because of the low level of risk associated with the reported leaks to date. Therefore, the public cannot be assured the initiative will remain in place in the future.

In addition, in 2010 NRC convened a Groundwater Task Force composed of NRC staff to evaluate NRC’s actions to address incidents of groundwater contamination at nuclear power plants and identify actions for a senior management review group to consider. Later that year, the task force issued a report that concluded that NRC is accomplishing its stated mission of protecting the public health and safety and the environment through its response to leaks and spills that contaminated groundwater. However, the report also concluded that NRC’s response to leaks and spills has varied widely and that NRC should further consider ways to communicate more timely and complete information to the public.
about these incidents. In early 2011, NRC reported the results of its senior
management’s review of the Groundwater Task Force report findings. This
report included four areas in which the agency committed to action: (1)
identifying and addressing policy issues related to groundwater
contamination; (2) enhancing the agency’s Reactor Oversight Process; (3)
developing specific actions in response to key themes and conclusions of
the Groundwater Task Force report; and (4) conducting a focused
dialogue with other regulators, such as EPA and states, to develop a
collaborative approach for enhanced groundwater protection.

Several Stakeholders Recommended That NRC Enhance Its Inspection,
Groundwater Monitoring, and Reporting Requirements

Several stakeholders noted that NRC should enhance its inspection
requirements for underground piping systems to help prevent leaks. In
addition, several stakeholders suggested that NRC make its groundwater
monitoring requirements more stringent to help detect leaks. Furthermore,
according to some stakeholders, NRC should require more timely
disclosure of information on leaks and make this information more
accessible to the public. The stakeholders we interviewed included
representatives from NRC, other federal and state agencies, industry and
industry groups, standards-setting organizations, and advocacy and other
interested groups, as well as independent consultants and experts.

Several Stakeholders Identified Enhancements NRC Could Make to Its Inspection Requirements

Several of the stakeholders we interviewed said that NRC should enhance
its inspection and testing requirements by requiring that licensees visually
inspect underground piping more frequently and regularly, inspect piping’s
structural integrity,25 and inspect and test nonsafety-related piping that
contains radioactive material. Many stakeholders who recommended more
frequent and regular inspections pointed out that NRC requires direct
visual inspection of underground pipes only when a pipe has been
excavated for another purpose.26 While some stakeholders wanted NRC to
require visual inspections even if that meant licensees would have to
excavate underground piping to do so, one stakeholder pointed out that
pipes can be damaged during excavation and that some pipes may not be

25According to NRC, such tests are typically called nondestructive examinations.

26In December 2010, NRC revised its guidance for plants operating beyond their original 40-
year license to include direct inspections of some piping even if it has not been excavated
for another purpose.
accessible through excavation if, for example, they lie under a road or building.

In addition, some stakeholders we interviewed recommended that NRC require inspections of structural integrity of safety-related underground piping systems, which can be susceptible to corrosion as plants age. NRC officials and other stakeholders noted that the pressure and flow tests NRC currently requires do not provide information about the structural integrity of an underground pipe, such as whether the pipe has degraded to the point that the thickness of its wall could hinder the pipe’s future performance. One stakeholder voiced concern that not having structural integrity information about safety-related underground piping systems could create a very significant risk to public health and safety if such pipes were to unexpectedly fail due to corrosion. Moreover, some of the stakeholders we interviewed noted that some of the inspection techniques used in the oil and gas industry to provide additional information about the structural integrity of underground pipes could be used in the nuclear power industry. However, these stakeholders recognized that applying such techniques at nuclear power plants may be difficult, largely because the technology for such tests has not been sufficiently developed for, or adapted to, the nuclear industry site conditions. For example, guided wave technology—a method that transmits ultrasonic energy through a pipe’s walls and monitors how the energy is reflected back to identify areas where a pipe may have corrosion—is used in the oil and gas industry, which tends to have miles of relatively straight piping through which waves can travel with little interference. However, the underground piping at nuclear power plants tends to include many bends and turns, which can distort the wave energy and interfere with the inspection test results. In addition, the oil and gas industry uses robotic devices sent through a pipe to capture images of its condition and identify areas of corrosion, but the bends and turns in pipes at nuclear power plants limit the use of robotic devices by the nuclear power industry. Although obtaining information about the structural integrity of pipes is currently challenging, based on stakeholders’ observations, NRC and licensees cannot be assured that underground safety-related pipes remain structurally sound without having information about degradation that has occurred. Without such assurance, the likelihood of future pipe failures cannot be as accurately assessed, and this increases the uncertainty surrounding the safety of the plants.

Industry and standards-setting organizations have undertaken activities to address the challenges of inspecting the structural integrity of underground piping systems at nuclear power plants. For example,
industry, through the Electric Power Research Institute, has undertaken research to develop new, and improve upon existing, techniques to provide reliable and usable results, and some licensees are trying these techniques at their plants. The licensee at the Seabrook Station, for instance, has plans to pilot test a mechanical robot that was developed by the Electric Power Research Institute to detect cracks in underground piping. In addition, stakeholders representing standards-setting organizations, such as NACE International and ASME, noted that they have undertaken efforts to evaluate and enhance current technologies and codes for inspecting underground piping systems. For example, according to a member of NACE International, the organization formed a buried piping task group to, among other things, evaluate the current state of inspection techniques and technologies for underground piping systems and determine how they could be applied at nuclear power plants.

Moreover, various stakeholders mentioned the need for NRC to require inspections and testing of nonsafety-related piping that contains radioactive material. Although NRC currently does not generally require such inspections, nonsafety-related piping has been the source of many reported leaks that resulted in groundwater contamination. For example, nonsafety-related piping was the source of leaks at the Oyster Creek and Braidwood plants. Some stakeholders said that any system whose failure could result in contamination of the environment should be prioritized for inspection and testing, even if it is not classified as being safety-related.

According to NRC stakeholders, NRC has limited ability to enhance the licensees’ inspection requirements of nonsafety-related underground piping systems, given the low level of risk associated with reported leaks to date, and the requirement that NRC justify the cost of new requirements relative to this risk. However, according to industry stakeholders, the voluntary Buried Piping/Underground Piping and Tanks Integrity Initiative may address stakeholder concerns related to inspection of nonsafety-related underground piping that carries radioactive material. This initiative includes a component under which licensees assign a risk rank to

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27NACE International was formerly known as the National Association of Corrosion Engineers. NACE International develops corrosion prevention and control standards for many industries from chemical processing and water systems to transportation and infrastructure protection.

28Aging Management Programs for some license renewals require inspection of nonsafety-related floor drain piping that can potentially contain radioactive materials.
segments of their underground piping based on the potential for and consequences of failure. As a result, systems that are safety-related and systems that contain radioactive materials receive a higher rank. According to the initiative, systems with a higher rank will be prioritized for inspection and testing, so industry stakeholders noted that piping containing radioactive materials would receive more attention under the initiative.

Several of the stakeholders we interviewed noted that NRC should have more stringent requirements for licensees to monitor on-site groundwater to quickly detect leaks. Industry stakeholders acknowledged the importance of detecting leaks early to minimize their consequences. A few stakeholders said they would like to see NRC require that licensees install groundwater monitoring wells in the vicinity of potential leaks based on a risk-informed assessment of the underground piping systems that have the highest likelihood of leaking and a current and thorough assessment of the site’s hydrogeology. Some stakeholders noted, however, that NRC should allow flexibility for licensees to determine the best approach to detect leaks at their own sites and to adapt their approach on the basis of evolving industry experience.

However, according to stakeholders at NRC, as is the case with inspection requirements, the agency is unlikely to be able to justify changing its groundwater monitoring requirements given the low level of risk associated with reported leaks. Nevertheless, industry and NRC stakeholders noted that components of the industry’s voluntary Groundwater Protection Initiative may address some stakeholders’ concerns with respect to groundwater monitoring. For example, one of the objectives of the initiative is to establish an on-site groundwater monitoring program by considering placing wells closer to systems with the highest potential for inadvertent releases that could contaminate groundwater. Moreover, many NRC stakeholders noted that the industry initiative goes well beyond what the agency can do in terms of regulations and has already been implemented, whereas establishing new regulations could take years. In fact, a review performed by senior managers at NRC concluded that, in view of the progress being made by industry through the initiative, efforts to amend NRC’s regulations to include the initiative are not necessary at this time. Moreover, industry stakeholders told us they do not consider the initiative to be voluntary since all of the power plants’ chief nuclear officers committed to its implementation. Other stakeholders, however, told us that the language in the initiative is not strong enough and expressed concern that, because NRC has no authority
to enforce the voluntary initiative, industry could move away from it at any point without recourse from NRC.

Some Stakeholders Said That NRC Should Require More Timely Leak Information from Licensees and Should Make It More Accessible to the Public

According to some stakeholders, NRC should require licensees to report information about the level and extent of groundwater contamination from a leak and the licensee’s assessment of a leak’s impact in a more timely manner. One stakeholder noted that the inability to obtain timely information about leaks could undermine the public’s confidence in NRC and licensee conclusions that a leak does not impact public health and safety. NRC currently requires licensees to make information on significant leaks available to the public by providing groundwater sample results and calculations of the radiation dose the public has received in its annual radioactive effluent and environmental reports. Consequently, even though NRC posts on its Web site some information about leaks as it becomes available, up to a year may pass between the time a leak occurs and the time the public receives information supporting the licensee’s assessment of the leaks’ impact.

In addition, some stakeholders noted that NRC should make information pertaining to leaks more accessible to the public. For example, some of these stakeholders said that NRC could improve the accessibility of information on its Web site. Specifically, one stakeholder said that the site is difficult to navigate, cumbersome, and unnecessarily slow. Another stakeholder noted that staff members at his organization had used NRC’s Web site to track information on groundwater contamination at a particular site, but the links they used were no longer available.

Conclusions

The occurrence of leaks at nuclear power plants from underground piping systems is expected to continue as nuclear power plants age and their piping systems corrode. While reported underground piping system leaks to date have not posed discernible health impacts to the public, there is no guarantee that future leaks’ impacts will be the same.

Some of our stakeholders noted that a future leak could put the public’s health and safety at risk if the leak went undetected for a long period of time. NRC’s groundwater monitoring requirements are intended to identify when the public could be or has been exposed through drinking water to radiation doses above certain limits rather than to promptly detect underground piping system leaks. NRC has concluded that, in general, licensees’ groundwater monitoring programs implemented under the voluntary groundwater initiative go beyond what the agency requires for
groundwater monitoring and could enhance licensees’ prevention of and response to potential leaks by detecting them early. However, without regularly evaluating the extent to which the initiative will result in prompt detection of leaks, NRC cannot be assured that groundwater monitoring programs under the initiative will detect leaks before they pose a risk to public health and safety.

In addition, although NRC has acknowledged that the corrosion of underground piping systems, particularly those that are safety-related, is a concern, limitations in the industry’s ability to measure the wall thickness of an underground pipe without excavation prevent licensees from determining the structural integrity of underground piping systems. Without being able to identify that an underground piping system’s structural integrity has not been compromised by corrosion, the risk to public health and safety is increased. In this context, licensees at nuclear power plants cannot assure that a safety-related pipe will continue to function properly between inspection intervals, thereby protecting the public’s health and safety.

To ensure the continued protection of the public’s health and safety, we recommend that the Chairman of NRC direct agency staff to take the following two actions:

- Periodically evaluate the extent to which the industry’s voluntary Groundwater Protection Initiative will result in prompt detection of leaks and, based upon these evaluations, determine whether the agency should expand its groundwater monitoring requirements.

- Stay abreast of ongoing industry research to develop technologies for structural integrity tests and, when they become feasible, analyze costs to licensees of implementing these tests compared with the likely benefits to public health and safety. Based on this analysis, NRC should determine whether it should expand licensees’ inspection requirements to include structural integrity tests for safety-related underground piping.

We provided a draft of this report to NRC for its review and comment. NRC provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III, and technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. NRC agreed with the information presented in the draft report and said they believe it to be fair and balanced. NRC also agreed
with each of the report recommendations and asserted that they have established activities to address the recommendations.

In responding to our recommendation to periodically evaluate the extent to which the industry voluntary Groundwater Protection Initiative will result in prompt detection of leaks and, based on these evaluations, determine whether the agency should expand its groundwater monitoring requirements, NRC stated that “the public can be assured that the NRC will continue to review the status of industry implementation of the initiative and consider regulatory changes as appropriate.” Specifically, NRC said that it reviews reported groundwater monitoring results and changes to licensees’ programs for identifying and controlling spills and leaks. However, as we reported, the agency has not assessed the adequacy of the licensees’ groundwater monitoring programs, which were implemented under the Groundwater Protection Initiative, to promptly detect leaks. Absent such an assessment, we continue to believe that NRC has no assurance that the Groundwater Protection Initiative will lead to prompt detection of underground piping system leaks as nuclear power plants age.

In addition, NRC agreed with our recommendation that it stay abreast of ongoing research on structural integrity tests; analyze the costs and benefits of implementing feasible tests; and, on the basis of this analysis, determine whether it should require structural integrity tests for safety-related piping. Further, NRC pointed out that it has established milestones to periodically assess both the performance of available inspection technology and the need to make changes to the current regulatory framework. Nevertheless, NRC said it “believes there is reasonable assurance that the underground piping systems will remain structurally sound.” We believe that structural integrity tests, when feasible, would provide enhanced assurance of underground piping systems’ structural soundness and enable more proactive oversight. As we reported, NRC’s currently required pipe testing procedures—which provide information about a pipe’s function at a particular point in time—do not indicate the presence of degradation in a pipe that could hinder its future performance.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, Chairman of NRC, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or rusco@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

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