Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments. JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.


Status of nuclear power plants in Eukushima of 12:00 May 21st (Estimated by JAIE)

	Status of	nuclear power plants in Fuku	shima <u>as of 12:00, May 21st</u> (Estim	ated by JAIF)			
Power Station	4		Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stati	on			
Unit Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	2 784 / 2381	784 / 2381	4 784 / 2381	5 784 / 2381	6 1100 /3293	
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	In Service -> Shutdown 400	In Service -> Shutdown 548	In Service -> Shutdown 548	Outage No fuel rods	Outage 548	Outage 764	
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)		Damaged (35%*1)	Damaged (30%*1)	No fuel rods		amaged	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage estimated	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged		amaged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage estimated	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged		amaged	
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary		otional	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional Not Functional Not Functional					Functioning (in cold shutdown)	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Partly opened	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion		
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Lower than the bottom of fuels	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe		afe	
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure	Gradually increasing (Gradually degrassing	Unknown / Stable	Unknown / Gradually increasing	Safe	c	afe	
Vessel	Gradually increasing / Gradually decreasing						
Containment Vessel Pressure	Stable Continuing (Switch from seawater to	Stable Continuing (Switch from seawater to	Stable	Safe	5	afe	
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	freshwater)	freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary		cessary	
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (started 4/27)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary		cessary	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary		cessary	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876	
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3	Not Da	amaged	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray continues (freshwater)	water injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Pool cooling capat	1	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power(Lighting and parmaeter monitoring restore	ed in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th, a	t Unit 2 on Mar. 26th, at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th)	Not damage	ed (estimate)	
	Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit for drinking water, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures. All the restrictions of intake of the water, which was once issued by the govedrment, have been lifted by May 10th. Radioactive cesium was detected in the sludge from a sewage treatment plants, one of which is 50 km far from the power station. Small amount of strontium was detected in some samples of soil and plants collected in the area 20-80 km far from the power station.						
Evacuation	Shall be evacuated for within 20km from N around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to be exp	IPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Shall s panded so as to include the area, where ann	stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consid	er leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30k People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate witl			
INES(estimated by NISA)	Level 7*2 ※Cumulative amount of radioact	ivity from Fukushima Diichi NPS has reac		Level 3 *2	_	_	
Remarks	revised on 5/17) High radiation circumstance hampering the wor with unit 2 on April 19 and counties. Works inside the reactor bldg becomes available Emergency power generators were moved to h each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/ The damaged containment vessel of unit 2 is n TEPCO developed the plan to cool the reactor leaking in Unit 3, TEPCO has revised its plan to TEPCO estimated that fuel pellets would have will not happen, since reactor have been coole © Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material is preparation work for covering the reactor build © Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP) Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP con The walls of the reactor building supporting the Construction work for intalling a heatexchager © Prevention of the proliferation of radioactive	ed reactors to a stable condition known as a rk to restore reactor cooling function at unit le after radiation inside were forcibly decrea igher ground in order to prevent the reactor 4 and for Unit 5/6. eed to be repaired before the work to resto through filling the containment vessel with o establish a cooling water recirculation sys melted and fallen to the bottom of the react d by means of water injection.*4 the reactor vessel may leaked outside. ent vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion sta- ling was started at Unit 1 (5/13). Operation ntinues for the purpose of cooling and make a pool were severely damaged by an explosi to cool the SFP began at Unit 2.(5/17–) ely contaminated substance:	t-1,2 and 3. Operation to discharge radioactive water in ased through air purification. rs' cooling systems from failing in case a major tsunam ore reactor cooling function. water up to the top of fuel level.(4/17) However, since stem that purifies the pooled water in the building and i stor at Unit 1 in its tentative assessment released on N	lay 15. TEPCO also predict that an event associated with la uled to start in June. e (H2NNH2), has been injected into the SFP (5/9–). cement to support the SFP is necessary.	le the buildings of all U e reliable after connecti king as in Unit 2 while	nit 1, 2, 3, started ing 3 power lines wi there was also risk	
[Source] Government Nuclear Emergency Response Head News Release (-5/19 17:00), Press conference NISA: News Release (-5/19 12:30), Press conference	quarters: INES: International Nuclear Eve Ce NISA: Nuclear and Industrial S	ulture, Sports, Science and Technology ent Scale afety Agency Company, Inc.	th and continues. *1 TEPCO's estimation revised on April 27 *2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for t *3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may substance detected from the water sample taken *4 TEPCO announced its tentative assessment o	/ have been damaged based on radioactive from the pool of Unit 4.	[Significance judge ■ Low ■ High ■ Severe (Need ir		

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station							
Unit	1	2	3	4				
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)		1100 / 3293						
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5				
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown							
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.							
INES(estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3				
Remarks	External power supply was available after the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after Latest Monitor Indication: 1.6μ Sv/h at 09:1	the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miya	tor pressure vessel using make-up water system, T agi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.	EPCO recovered the core cooling function				

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown				
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
Remarks	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.				

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	In cold shutdown.		
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.		




Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.

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Nuclear Power Plant Safety and related items	Parameters in the tal
Reactor Safety y Cooling Design base cooling capability	 Operation Status at the earthque Core cooling requiring AC power1 (Large volumetric freshwater inject) Core cooling requiring AC power2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)
Containment Containment Function Containment GReactor Pressure vessel Containment Function Containment GReactor Pressure vessel Containment Vessel	 Core and Fuel Integrity Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity Containment Vessel pressure Containment Vessel Integrity
Accident Management : AM> (Operation beyond design base accident) Alternative Cooling operation Operation for containment vessel protection against burst	 Building Integrity Iinjection to core (AM) Injection to Containment Vessel (AI Containment Venting (AM)
Safety of the spent fuel pool	Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool (Fuel Damage) Cooling of the spent fuel pool (Water injection, pool temp, water let
Work environment in main control room	Main Control Room Habitability an (ventiration, Lights, Indicator)
Environmental effect Evacuation	Environmental effect (Radiation M

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Accidents of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations

1. Latest Major event and response

May 17th

08:00 "Mega float", a giant storage barge, arrived at the Onahama port in Iwaki City, south of Fukushima Daiich NPS.

10:11 Water flow into the No.3 reactor through its feed water line was increased from 6m3/h to 9m3/h, making the tatal water flow 18m3/h with 9m3/h through fire extinguishing line.

11:50 Water flow into the No.1 reactor was decreased from 10m3/h to 6m/m3 after confirmed the parameter response of the reactor and the containment vessel to the water flow increase.

18:04 Transfer of accumulated water in the basement of Unit 3 T/B to the central waste process facility.

1614-20:06 Freshwater with some hydrazine was sprayed into the SFP at Unit 4 using concrete pump vehicle.

10:00-14:00 Accumulated water in the basement of Unit 6 T/B was transferred to a makeshift tank.

09:00-16:00 Operation of removing debris was conducted using remote-controlled heavy machinary.

10:30-14:00 Operation of spraying synthetic resin was conducted to prevent scatter of radioactive materials. May 18th

13:10-14:40 Water with some Hydrazine was injected into the Unit 3 SFP through its SFP cooling and cleaning system.

10:00-14:00 Accumulated water in the basement of Unit 6 T/B was transferred to a makeshift tank.

10:30- Accumulated water in the basement of Unit 6 T/B was transferred to the waste process building.

13:10- Freshwater with some hydrazine was injected into the SFP at Unit 2.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

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	Unit 1		Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
cidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel	10th 05:00 Cooling SED with DHD nump started at Unit 5
t on Special	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	Storage Pool increased at 84 °C 15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
es Concerning Emergency	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
eparedness	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external Au power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room	
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	becomes available	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed	radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		May1 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h	conducted.	tank started.
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.		May 6 12:38 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck	May2 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	conducted.	tank conducted. May 2 11:03 The Residual heat removal pump temporally
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)	May 7 14:05 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck	May3 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	conducted.	tank conducted.
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	, , , ,	May7 10:00 The operation of transferring water
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condencer to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	May 11 16:07 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May9 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed	May 13 16:04 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May10 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.		May10 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	Apr. 13th 17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated in the trench outside the turbine building to the condenser completed	May 8 12:10 Water injected the SFP by temporally installed motor driven pump conducted.		May11 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 29 11:36 The inside of the building was inspected. It was confirmed that there is no water significant leakage from the CV.	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	May 9 12:14 Water injected the SFP by originally installed clean up system conducted.		May11 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen completed	May 15 14:33 180kg of boric acid injection to No3 Reactor started.		May12 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	May 5 11:32-16:36 Ventilators to clean the highly radioactive air inside the reactor building were installed and started.	Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote- controlled robot.	May 16 15:00 Water injection by temporally installed motor driven pump started.		May12 10:30 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	May 11 08:58 N2 injection to the CV temporally stopped while the work for restoring one of external power sources being conducted. It resumed later.	Apr. 19 10:08 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility			May13 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	the gage.	Apr. 30 14:05 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the vertical part of the concrete tunnel outside the turbine BLDG to the waste processing facility			May 13 11:00 Water accumulated in the room for high pressure injection system room discharged to other space
		May 1 13:35 The work to block the vertical concrete tunnel outside the turbine bldg started.			May14 10:00 The operation of transferring water
		May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.			accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.

as of 17:00, May 19th



		May 6 09:36 Water injected the SFP conducted May 7 09:22 Operation of discharging water accumulated in the concrete tunnel outside turbine bldgtto he waste processing facility temporally stopped while piping work for feeding water into the reactor being			May15 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.	
		May 10 13:09 Water injected the SFP conducted May 12 15:20 Operation of discharging water accumulated in the concrete tunnel outside turbine bldg to the waste processing facility temporally restarted,			May16 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.	
		May 14 13:00 Water injection to the SFP was done				
	Reactor Water level (May 19 11:00) (A) (Lower beyond lower end of the gauge , (B) -1650mm Reactor pressure (May 19 11:00) (A) 0.528MPaG, (B) 1.408MPaG*2 CV pressure (May 19 11:00) 0.1391MPaabs	(A) -1500mm, (B) -2150mm	Reactor Water level (May 19 11:00) (A) -1850mm, (B) -2300mm Reactor pressure (May 19 11:00) (A) -0.098MPaG*2, (B) -0.096MPaG*2 CV pressure (May 19 11:00) 0.1022MPaabs	SFP water temperature measured with a concrete pump vehicle Apr. 12 : about 90 °C 22 before spray: about 91 °C	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 43.4°C (May 19 12:00) Unit 6 39.0°C (May 19 12:00)	
	RPV temperature (May 19 11:00) 103.6°C*2 at feed water line nozzle	PRV temporature (May 10.11:00)	RPV temperature (May 19 11:00) 121.2°C*2 at feed water line nozzle	23 before spray: about 83 °C 23 after spray : about 66 °C 24 before spray: about 86 °C		
	Thermography (Apr. 26 23:00) CV: 25°C, SFP: 23°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) Top of R/B: 24°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 26°C, SFP: 56°C	24 after spray : about 81 °C		

(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS) 12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate


15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations: SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel R/B: Reactor Building RHR: Residual Heat Removal system CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

T/B: Turbine Building

Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake



*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page; "http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special_4.html". *2 Data trend is continuously monitored.

