Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 12:00, May 13th (Estimated by JAIF)

D Chat's a		nacical power plants in rana	<u> </u>				
Power Station	 	1 0	Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stati	on I	- 1		
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 /3293	
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage	
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764	
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (55%*1)	Damaged (35%*1)	Damaged (30%*1)	No fuel rods	Not Da	maged	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Da	maged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Da		
Core cooling requiring AC power 1		Barriago aria Esarrago Saspostoa	1100 damaged (oscimation)			<u> </u>	
(Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Funct		
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functi (in cold s		
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole of avoiding hydro		
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Lower than the bottom of fuels	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Sa	fe	
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure			r doi expeded partially of fally				
Vessel	after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown / Gradually increasing	Safe	Sa	fe	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Sa	fe	
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not nec	essary	
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (started 4/27)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary	Not nec	essary	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not nec		
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876	
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected		Not Da		
ruel integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3	NOL Da	maged	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray continues (freshwater)	water injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater), Hydrogen from the pool exploded (3/15)	Pool cooling capabi	lity was recovered	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power(Lighting and parmaeter monitoring restore	d in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th, a	at Unit 2 on Mar. 26th, at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th)	Not damaged	d (estimate)	
Environmental effect	Radioactive materials continues to be detected in samples corrected from underground water and sea water at or near the site. Environmental monitoring has been enhanced. Radioactive Iodine and cesium have been detected in the seabed samples taken 15–20 km far from the plant from 15–20m deep. Level of radiation is 100 to 1,000 times above normal. (5/4) Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk, agricultural products and seafood from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment and intake of some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit for drinking water, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures. All the restrictions of intake of the water have been lifted by May 10th. Radioactive cesium was detected in the sludge from a sewage treatment plant 50 km far from the power station.						
Evacuation	Small amount of strontium was detected in some samples of soil and plants corrected in the area that is 20-80 km far from the power station. (1) Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) (2) Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) (3) Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) (4) Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS (5) The 20km evacuation zon around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to be expanded so as to include the area, where annual radiation exposure is expected to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate within a month or so. People living in the 20 to 30km and other than the expanded evacuation area mentioned above, are asked to get prepared for staying indoors or evacuation in an emergency (announced on Apr. 11th and issued on Apr. 22nd).						
INES(estimated by NISA)	Level 7*2		hed the level to be classified as level 7. as much as one in the Chernobyl accident so far.	Level 3 *2	_	_	
	Progress of the work to restore cooling function TEPCO announced its plan to bring the damaged reactors to a stable condition known as a "cold shutdown" in about six to nine months, a situation in which water temperatures inside the reactors have been stably brought below 100 C.(4/17) High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore reactor cooling function at unit-1,2 and 3. Operation to discharge radioactive water in the basement of the buildings and concrete tunnels outside the buildings of all Unit 1, 2, 3, started with unit 2 on April 19 and counties. Blocking the concrete tunnel was started at Unit 2,(5/1-) Ventilators were installed at Unit 1,(5/5), to clean the highly radioactive air inside the reactor building for improving working environment. The doors the building were opened (5/8-). After calibration of the reactor water level monitors, it was found that the reactor water level was lower than the bottom of the fuels at Unit 1 (5/12). Emergency power generators were moved to higher ground in order to prevent the reactors' cooling systems from failing in case a major tsunami hits the plant again. External power source becomes more reliable after connecting 3 power lines of each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/4 and for Unit 5/6. The damaged containment vessel of unit 2 is need to be repaired before the work to restore reactor cooling function. TEPCO developed the plan to cool the reactor through filling the containment vessel with water up to the top of fuel level. NISA accepted TEPCO's safety evaluation for this plan for unit 1 such as impact of increased dead weight of water.(5/5). The operation of pumping more water into No1 reactor in line with this plan continues. © Function of containing radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside. NISA estimated that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness. Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containment vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion started on April 6th and continues. © C						
Remarks	each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/ The damaged containment vessel of unit 2 is n TEPCO developed the plan to cool the reactor The operation of pumping more water into No1 Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containme Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP) Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP cor	igher ground in order to prevent the reactor 4 and for Unit 5/6. leed to be repaired before the work to restor through filling the containment vessel with reactor in line with this plan continues. the reactor vessel may leaked outside. NIS/ent vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion stantinues for the purpose cooling and make up	rs' cooling systems from failing in case a major tsunamere reactor cooling function. Water up to the top of fuel level. NISA accepted TEPC A estimated that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 arted on April 6th and continues. Water evaporated. Corrosion inhibitor, Hydrazine (H2	CO`s safety evaluation for this plan for unit 1 such as impact and 3 may have lost air tightness. NNH2), has been injected into the SFP (5/9-).			
Remarks	each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/ The damaged containment vessel of unit 2 is n TEPCO developed the plan to cool the reactor The operation of pumping more water into No1 Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containmed Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP) Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP con The walls of the reactor building supporting the Prevention of the proliferation of radioactive TEPCO announced the plans to prevent radioactive Full operation of spraying synthetic resin to co	digher ground in order to prevent the reactor 4 and for Unit 5/6. Heed to be repaired before the work to restor through filling the containment vessel with reactor in line with this plan continues. The reactor vessel may leaked outside. NISA ent vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion stantinues for the purpose cooling and make up to pool were severely damaged by an explosively contaminated substance: Actively contaminated water, dust and soil and anticontaminated dust started on Apr. 26	re reactor cooling function. water up to the top of fuel level. NISA accepted TEPC A estimated that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 arted on April 6th and continues. water evaporated. Corrosion inhibitor, Hydrazine (H2 on on March 15th at unit-4. Work for structural reinford radioactive material itself existing on site from spre	20`s safety evaluation for this plan for unit 1 such as impact and 3 may have lost air tightness. NNH2), has been injected into the SFP (5/9-). Indeed to support the SFP is necessary. Adding on Apr 17.			

Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release (-<u>5/12 17:00</u>), Press conference NISA: News Release (-<u>5/11 06:00</u>), Press conference TEPCO: Press Release (-<u>5/12 21:00</u>), Press Conference

[Abbreviations]
MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
INES: International Nuclear Event Scale
NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

*2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for the accident of Unit 1 through 3

*3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may have been damaged based on radioactive substance detected from the water sample taken from the pool of Unit 4.

Low High

Severe (Need immediate action)


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station					
Unit	1	2	3	4		
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293					
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown					
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	_	Level 3		
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. Latest Monitor Indication: 1.6 µ Sv/h at 21:00, May 12th at NPS border Evacuation Area: 3km from NPS(3/12 7:45), 10km from NPS(3/12 17:39), 8km from NPS(4/21)					

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown				
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
Remarks	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.				

Operation Status at the earthquake occurred In Service -> Automatic Shutdown	
Status In cold shutdown.	
Remarks No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.	

Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.



Accidents of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations

as of 17:00, May 12th

1. Latest Major event and response

May 10th

13:09-14:45 Operation of injecting water to the Unit 3 SFP was conducted

Brief home visit of evacuees has been started:

54 households, 92 people, have done on May 10th. More visits are planned for 50 households on May 12th and are being scheduled for 120 households. Visits of the rest are planned in the end of May. May 11th

12:30 Water flow into a pit for the Unit 3 water intake power cables was found. Sampling of the water was conducted.

18:45 Stop of the water flow was confirmed after blocking the flow pass by injecting concrete.

May 12th

05:00 It was found that the reactor water level was lower than the bottom of fuels.

2 Chronology of Nuclear Bower Stations

2. Unron	ology	OT	Nuclear Power	Stati
		_		

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
				14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	Pool increased at 84°C	at Unit 5
The Act on Special	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15 occurred	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished	19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started
Measures Concerning	(Incapability of water injection by core cooling function) 12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred	by core cooling function)	12th OF 10 Frant falling under Article 15* approved // app of	spontaneously)	at Unit 6
Nuclear Emergency		13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
Prenaredness	(Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling	reactor cooling functions)	spontaneously) Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent	
ropareariess	12th 14:30 Start venting	functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	fuel pool continues.	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes	external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	available	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in
	·		14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred		the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	(Abnormal rise of CV pressure)		the Unit 5 condenser.
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion,			May2 10:00 The operation of transferring water
	started in addition to fire extinguish line	Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the
	started in addition to the extinguish line	Suppression Foot damage suspected			makeshift tank started.
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
	available 25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34. 10:00 White smoke reeked		
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the		Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel		
	basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	pool continues.		
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the				
	trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)		
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes		
	surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)		available		
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.		
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after	intake	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the		
	opening all valves through the line.	2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the conden4er to the CST	surge tank		
		Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of	Surge tank	<u> </u>	
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main	unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 a	nd 4 seawater screen completed	
	condenser to the CST completed.	It was confirmed that water flow stopped			
	Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B	Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a		
	using a remote-controlled robot. Apr. 29 11:36 The inside of the building was inspected.		remote-controlled robot.		
	It was confirmed that there is no water significant	Apr. 13th 17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated			
	leakage from the CV.	in the trench outside the turbine building to the condenser completed			
	May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched	451 4445 1 4 11 2 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4			
	from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to	Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen			
	install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	completed			
	May 5 11:32-16:36 Ventilators to clean the highly	Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled			
	radioactive air inside the reactor building were installed	robot.			
	and started.	Apr. 19 10:08 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the turbine			
		building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility			
		Apr. 30 14:05 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the vertical			
		part of the concrete tunnel outside the turbine BLDG to the waste processing			
		May 1 13:35 The work to block the vertical concrete tunnel outside the turbine bldg			
		started.			
		May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection			
		pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.			
		pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source			
	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Un				
Major Data *1	Reactor Water level (May 12 11:00) (A) (lower than the scale), (B) -1700mm	Reactor Water level (May <u>12 11:00</u>) (A) <u>-1500</u> mm, (B) <u>-2100</u> mm	Reactor Water level (May <u>12 11:15</u>) (A) <u>-1700</u> mm, (B) <u>-1950</u> mm	SFP water temperature measured with a concrete	Water temperature of SFP
	Reactor pressure (May 12 11:00)	Reactor pressure (May <u>12 11:00</u>)	Reactor pressure (May 12 11:15)	pump vehicle	Unit 5 42.2°C (May 12 13:00)
	(A) <u>0.465</u> MPaG, (B) <u>1.300</u> MPaG*2	(A) <u>-0.023</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.018</u> MPaG*2	(A) <u>-0.087</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.096</u> MPaG*2	Apr. 12 : about 90 °C	Unit 6 29.5°C (May 12 13:00)
	CV pressure (May 12 11:00) 0.1212MPaabs	CV pressure (May <u>12 11:00</u>) <u>0.055</u> MPaabs	CV pressure (May <u>12 11:00</u>) <u>0.1027</u> MPaabs	22 before spray: about 91°C	
	·	RPV temperature (May 12 11:00)		23 before spray: about 83 °C	
	RPV temperature (May <u>12 11:00</u>) 114.9°C*2 at feed water line nozzle	114.8°C at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (May <u>12 11:15</u>)	23 after spray: about 66°C	
		Water temperature in SFP (May 12 11:00) 50.0°C	189.2°C*2 at feed water line nozzle	24 before spray: about 86°C	
	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30)	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30)	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30)	24 after spray : about 81 °C	
	CV: 25°C, SFP: 23°C	Top of R/B: 24°C	CV: 26°C, SFP: 56°C		



(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations:

SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool

EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel

R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

T/B: Turbine Building

Safe (Not affected by the quake)

*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page;

"http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special_4.html".

*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.



