Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments. JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.


Status of nuclear power plants in Eukushima as of 12:00 May 5th (Estimated by JAIE)

	Status of	nuclear power plants in Fuki	ushima <u>as of 12:00, May 5th</u> (Estima	ated by JAIF)		
Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station					
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 /3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage Outage	
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (55%*1)	Damaged (35%*1)	Damaged (30%*1)	No fuel rods	Not Da	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Da	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Da	maged
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Funct	tional
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functioning (in cold shutdown)	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Sa	fe
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	Sa	fe
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Sa	fe
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing(Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not neo	cessary
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (started $4/27$)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary	Not neo	cessary
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not neo	,
						-
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3	Not Da	maged
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray continues (freshwater)	water injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater), Hydrogen from the pool exploded (3/15)	Pool cooling capab	ility was recovere
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power(ighting and parmaeter monitoring restore	d in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th, a	at Unit 2 on Mar. 26th. at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th)	Not damage	d (estimate)
Environmental effect	Radioactive Iodine and cesium have been detected in the seabed samples taken 15-20 km far from the plant from 15-20m deep. Level of radiation is 100 to 1,000 times above normal. (5/4) Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk, agricultural products and seafood from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment and intake of some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit for drinking water, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures. Radioactive cesium was detected in the sludge from a sewage treatment plant 50 km far from the power station.					
Evacuation	Small amount of strontium was detected in some samples of soil and plants corrected in the area that is 20-80 km far from the power station.					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 7*2		—	—		
Remarks	 Progress of the work to restore cooling function High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore reactor cooling function at unit-1,2 and 3. Operation to discharge radioactive water in the basement of the buildings and concrete tunnels outside the buildings of all Unit 1, 2, 3, started with unit 2 on April 19 and counties. Emergency power generators were moved to higher ground in order to prevent the reactors' cooling systems from failing in case a major tsunami hits the plant again. External power source becomes more reliable after connecting 3 power lines with each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/ 4 and for Unit 5/6. TEPCO announced its plan to bring the damaged reactors to a stable condition known as a "cold shutdown" in about six to nine months, a situation in which water temperatures inside the reactors have been stably brought below 100 C.(4/17). The damaged containing radioactive material Its presumed that radioactive material Is presumed that radioactive to the SFP continues for the purpose cooling and make up water evaporated. The walls of the reactor building supporting the pool were severely damaged by an explosion on March 15th at unit-4. Work for structural reinforcement to support the SFP is necessary. Prevention of prevision of radioactively contaminated water, dust and soil and radioactive material itself existing on site from spreading on Apr 17. 					
	Full operation of spraying synthetic resin to co	ntain contaminated dust started on Apr. 26	th and continues.			
[Source] [Abbreviations] *1 TEPCO's estimation revised on April 27 Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology *2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for the accident of Unit 1 through 3 News Release (-5/1 17:00), Press conference NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency *3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may have been damaged based on radioactive NISA: News Release (-5/3 15:00), Press conference TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. substance detected from the water sample taken from the pool of Unit 4.			[Significance ju ■ Low ■ High ■ Severe (Ne action)			

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station							
Unit	1	2	3	4				
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)		1100 / 3293						
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5				
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred		In Service -> Automatic Shutdown						
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.							
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3				
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling funct unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. Latest Monitor Indication: <u>1.7 µ Sv/h at 09:00, May 5th</u> at NPS border Evacuation Area: 3km from NPS(3/12 7:45), 10km from NPS(3/12 17:39), 8km from NPS(4/21)							

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station		
Unit	1	2	3
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.		
Remarks	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings h shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.		y Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have

Operation Status at the earthquake occurred In Service -> Automatic Shutdown	
Status In cold shutdown.	
Remarks No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.	




Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.

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Nuclear Power Plant Safety and related items	Parameters in the tal
Reactor Safety y Cooling Design base cooling capability	 Operation Status at the earthque Core cooling requiring AC power1 (Large volumetric freshwater inject) Core cooling requiring AC power2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)
Containment Containment Function Containment GReactor Pressure vessel Containment Function Containment GReactor Pressure vessel Containment Vessel	 Core and Fuel Integrity Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity Containment Vessel pressure Containment Vessel Integrity
Accident Management : AM> (Operation beyond design base accident) Alternative Cooling operation Operation for containment vessel protection against burst	 Building Integrity Injection to core (AM) Injection to Containment Vessel (AI Containment Venting (AM)
Safety of the spent fuel pool	 Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool (Fuel Damage) Cooling of the spent fuel pool (Water injection, pool temp, water let)
Work environment in main control room	Main Control Room Habitability an (ventiration, Lights, Indicator)
Environmental effect Evacuation	Environmental effect (Radiation M Evacuation (Order, Evacuated Area

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Accidents of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations

as of 12:00, May 5th

1. Latest Major event and response

May 1st

09:00-16:15 Four containers of contaminated debris was remved using remote-controled heavy machines.

10:3014:00 The operation of spraying synthetic resin to prevent contaminated dust and soil from spreading was conducted.

13:35 The operation to block the vertical concrete tunnel outside the Unit 2 T/B started.

14:00-17:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in the Unit 6 T/B to the makeshift tank was conducted.

<u>May 2nd</u>

09:00-16:00 The operation of spraying synthetic resin to prevent contaminated dust and soil from spreading was conducted.

Work for setting up a local ventilation uniit to improve the work environment in the Unit 1 R/B was started.

.<u>May 3rd</u>

14:00-17:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in the Unit 6 T/B to the makeshift tank was conducted.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

((1)	Fukushima	Dai-ichi	NPS

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	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in S Pool increased at 84°C	
The Act on Special	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15 occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd flo spontaneously)	
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguis spontaneously)	
Preparedness	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying v fuel pool continues.	
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control	
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	available	
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)		
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked		
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)		
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available		
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.		
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the conden4er to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and	d 4 seawater screen completed	
	Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.		Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.		
		Apr. 13th 17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated in the trench outside the turbine building to the condenser completed			
		Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen completed			
		Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote- controlled robot.			
		Apr. 19 10:08 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility			
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source				
	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1 and 2 seawater screen and intake completed				
	Reactor Water level (May 4 11:00)	Reactor Water level (May 4 11:00)	Reactor Water level (May <u>4 11:00</u>)		
Major Data *1	(A) <u>-1700</u> mm, (B) <u>-1700</u> mm	(A) <u>-1500</u> mm, (B) <u>-2100</u> mm	(A) <u>-1800</u> mm, (B) <u>-2200</u> mm	SFP water temperature measured	
	Reactor pressure (May <u>4 11:00</u>)		Reactor pressure (May <u>4 11:00</u>)	pump vehicle	
	(A) <u>0.450</u> MPaG, (B) <u>1.265</u> MPaG*2	(A) <u>-0.020</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.016</u> MPaG*2	(A) <u>-0.077</u> MPaG*2, (B) <u>-0.091</u> MPaG*2	Apr. 12 : about 90 °C	
	CV pressure (May <u>4 11:00</u>) <u>0.135</u> MPaabs		CV pressure (May <u>4 11:00</u>) <u>0.1033</u> MPaabs	22 before spray: about 91 °C	
	RPV temperature (May 4 11:00)	RPV temperature (May 4 11:00)	RPV temperature (May 4 11:00)	23 before spray: about 83 °C	
	$\frac{137.5^{\circ}C^{*2}}{127.5} \approx 10^{\circ}C^{*2}$ at feed water line nozzle	<u>117.0°C at feed water line nozzle</u> Water temperature in SFP (May <u>4 11:00</u>) <u>49.0</u> °C	$\frac{128.5}{128.5}$ °C*2 at feed water line nozzle	23 after spray : about 66 °C 24 before spray: about 86 °C	
	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 25°C, SFP: 23°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) Top of R/B: 24°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 26°C, SFP: 56°C	24 after spray : about 81 °C	



	Unit-5 and 6
Spent Fuel Storage	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5
floor (extinguished	19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
uished	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
g water to the spent	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
trol room becomes	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in
	the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
ed with a concrete	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 <u>40.8°C (May 4 12:00)</u> Unit 6 36.0°C (May 4 12:00)
; C	Unit 6 <u>36.0</u> °C (<u>May 4 12:00</u>)
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(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)12th 07:45State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

- 12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate
- 12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate
- 12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate
- 15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house
- 25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations: SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel R/B: Reactor Building RHR: Residual Heat Removal system CST: Condensate water Storage Tank T/B: Turbine Building *1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page;
"http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special_4.html".
*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.

Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

