

# Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

## Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

**Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 12:00, April 28th (Estimated by JAIF)**

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station					
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 / 3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (55%*1)	Damaged (35%*1)	Damaged (30%*1)	No fuel rods	Not Damaged	Not Damaged
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	Not Damaged
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	Not Damaged
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functional	Functional
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functioning (in cold shutdown)	Functioning
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion
Water Level of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Safe	Safe
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	Safe	Safe
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Safe	Safe
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (started 4/27)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporarily stopped	Temporarily stopped	Temporarily stopped	Not necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3	Not Damaged	Not Damaged
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray continues (freshwater)	water injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater), Hydrogen from the pool exploded (3/15)	Pool cooling capability was recovered	Pool cooling capability was recovered
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting and parameter monitoring restored in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th, at Unit 2 on Mar. 26th, at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th)				Not damaged (estimate)	
Environmental effect	<p>● Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site                      Radiation level: 430 μSv/h at the south side of the office building, 48 μSv/h at the Main gate, 19 μSv/h at the West gate, as of 09:00, Apr. 28th                      Small amount of plutonium was detected from the soil sampled at the site.                      Radioactive materials were detected from underground water sampled near the turbine buildings. (3/30). The concentration of the radioactive materials has increased and the monitoring of the underground water is to be expanded. (4/16--)                      Radioactive materials exceeding the regulatory limit have been detected from seawater sample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi NPS since Mar. 21st. The concentration of radioactive iodine, I-131, detected near the discharge outlet was 1,200 times as much as legal limit.(4/22) The concentrations are declining as a whole.                      TEPCO and MEXT has expanded the monitoring for the surrounding sea area since Apr 4th.                      ● Influence to the people's life                      Radioactive material was detected from milk, agricultural products and seafood from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment and intake for some products.                      Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures.                      Small amount of strontium was detected from some samples of soil and plants taken in the area that is 20-80 km far from the power station.</p>					
Evacuation	<p>&lt;1&gt; Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) &lt;2&gt; Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th)                      &lt;3&gt; Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) &lt;4&gt; Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS &lt;5&gt;The 20km evacuation zone around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to be expanded so as to include the area, where annual radiation exposure is expected to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate within a month or so. People living in the 20 to 30km and other than the expanded evacuation area mentioned above, are asked to get prepared for staying indoors or evacuation in an emergency (announced on Apr. 11th and issued on Apr. 22nd).</p>					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 7*2 ※Cumulative amount of radioactivity from Fukushima Daiichi NPS has reached the level to be classified as level 7. Total amount of radioactive materials released to the environment in this accident is one tenth as much as one in the Chernobyl accident so far.			Level 3 *2		—
Remarks	<p>● Progress of the work to recover injection function                      High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore cooling reactor function at unit-1,2 and 3. Operation to discharge radioactive water in the basement of the buildings and concrete tunnels outside the buildings of Unit 1 through 3, started with unit 2 on April 19 and counties.                      Distribution switchboards for water injection pumps of Unit 1 through 3 reactors were moved to heights to avoid tsunami. To connect electric 3 power lines with each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/ 4 and for Unit 5/6 was completed to make external power source more reliable.(4/26)                      On Apr. 17th, TEPCO announced that that it plans to fill the containment vessels of Unit 1 and 3 with water up to the levels of covering the fuels in the reactors while considering fixing the damaged containment vessel of Unit 2. It will also install heat exchangers to remove the heat from the reactors and lead them into cold shutdown in about 3 to 6 months.                      ● Function of containing radioactive material                      It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioactive material found outside. NISA estimated that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness although it is unlikely that these are cracks or holes in the reactor pressure vessels.                      Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1 containment vessel started to prevent hydrogen explosion on Apr. 6th. TEPCO announced the plans to prevent radioactively contaminated water, dust and soil and radioactive material itself existing on site from spread.                      ● Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP)                      Steam like substance rising intermittently from the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP has been conducted.                      The walls of the reactor building supporting the pool were severely damaged by an explosion on March 15th at unit-4. Work for reinforcement is necessary to support the SFL structurally.                      ● Prevention of the proliferation of contaminated dust:                      Full operation of spraying synthetic resin to contain contaminated dust started on Apr. 26th.</p>					

[Source]  
 Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters:  
 News Release (-4/27 17:00), Press conference  
 NISA: News Release (-4/27 12:00), Press conference  
 TEPCO: Press Release (-4/28 09:00), Press Conference

[Abbreviations]  
 MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology  
 INES: International Nuclear Event Scale  
 NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency  
 TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.  
 NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

\*1 TEPCO's estimation revised on April 27  
 \*2 Correction: Rating was raised from 5 to 7 for the accident of Unit 1 through 3  
 \*3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may have been damaged based on radioactive substance detected from the water sample taken from the pool of Unit 4.

[Significance judged by JAIF]  
 ■ Low  
 ■ High  
 ■ Severe (Need immediate action)


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ri Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293			
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3
Remarks	<p>Unit-1, 2, 3 &amp; 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one.</p> <p>No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.</p> <p>Latest Monitor Indication: <u>1.9 <math>\mu</math> Sv/h at 09:00, Apr. 28th</u> at NPS border</p> <p>Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS</p>			

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station		
Unit	1	2	3
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.		
Remarks	<p>3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.</p>		

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ri
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown
Status	In cold shutdown.
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.

**Parameters in the Table**

JALIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.





**1. Latest Major event and response**

Apr. 23rd  
 12:30-16:44 Some 140 tons of water was sprayed into the SFP using a concrete pump vehicle at Unit 4. The water temperature of the SFP decreased from 83 °C before spraying to 66°C after spraying.  
 Apr. 24th  
 09:00-16:00 Removing of debris was conducted using remote-control heavy equipment.  
 12:25-17:07 Some 165 tons of water was sprayed into the SFP using a concrete pump vehicle at Unit 4.  
 Apr. 25th  
 09:00-16:00 Removing of debris was conducted using remote-control heavy equipment.  
 18:15-24:26 Some 210 tons of water was sprayed into the SFP using a concrete pump vehicle at Unit 4.  
 Apr. 26th  
 12:25-14:03 Some 47.5 ton of freshwater wa injected in the SFP at unit 3.  
 16:50-20:35 Some 130 tons of water was sprayed into the SFP using a concrete pump vehicle at Unit 4.  
Apr. 27th  
 12:18- Water spraying into the SFP using a concrete pump vehicle was started at Unit 4.

**2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations**

**(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS**

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5
<i>*The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness</i>	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting		
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)		
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked		
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)		
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available		
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.		
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the conden4er to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed		
	Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.		
		Apr. 13th 17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated in the trench outside the turbine building to the condenser completed			
		Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen completed			
		Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.			
		Apr. 19 10:08 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility			
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source				
	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1 and 2 seawater screen and intake completed				
Major Data *1	Reactor Water level (Apr. 27 11:00) (A) -1650mm, (B) -1650mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. 27 11:00) (A) -1500mm, (B) -2100mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. 27 11:00) (A) -1850mm, (B) -2250mm	SFP water temperature measured with a concrete pump vehicle Apr. 12 : about 90°C 22 before spray: about 91°C 23 before spray: about 83°C 23 after spray : about 66°C 24 before spray: about 86°C 24 after spray : about 81°C	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 40.8°C (Apr. 27 12:00) Unit 6 27.5°C (Apr. 27 12:00)
	Reactor pressure (Apr. 27 11:00) (A) 0.445MPaG, (B) 1.203MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (Apr. 27 11:00) (A) -0.018MPaG*2, (B) -0.025MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (Apr. 27 11:00) (A) -0.053MPaG*2, (B) -0.089MPaG*2		
	CV pressure (Apr. 27 11:00) 0.155MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. 27 11:00) 0.075MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. 27 11:00) 0.1029MPaabs		
	RPV temperature (Apr. 27 11:00) 130.0°C*2 at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (Apr. 27 11:00) 120.3°C at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (Apr. 27 11:00) 82.3°C*2 at feed water line nozzle		
	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 25°C, SFP: 23°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) Top of R/B: 24°C	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 26°C, SFP: 56°C		

**(2) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs**

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15\*)

**3. State of Emergency Declaration**

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)  
 12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

**4. Evacuation Order**

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house  
 12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate  
 12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate  
 12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate  
 15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house  
 25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

**Abbreviations:**

SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool  
 EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator  
 RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel  
 R/B: Reactor Building  
 RHR: Residual Heat Removal system  
 CST: Condensate water Storage Tank  
 T/B: Turbine Building

\*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page; "http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special\_4.html".  
 \*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.

# Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

The accident that brings environmental impact is going on at several units in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power Station after the earthquake occurred on March 11th. Other nuclear power plants in Japan are in normal operation or safely shutdown.

