Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments. JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

				imated by JAIF)		
Power Station			Fukushima Dai−ichi Nuclear Power S	tation	-	
Unit	1 460 / 1380	2	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	5 784 / 2381	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW) Type of Reactor	800 / 1380 BWR-3	784 / 2381 BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	1100 /3293 BWR-5
	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown				
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred			In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
uel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity(Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (70%*1)	Damaged (30%*1)	Damaged (25%*1)	No fuel rods		amaged
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged)amaged
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not L	amaged
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary		ctional
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	(in cold	tioning shutdown)
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on hydroge	the rooftop for avoid n explosion
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	S	Safe
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure /essel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	S	Safe
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	5	Safe
Nater injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing(Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing(Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary		ecessary
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	(To be confirmed)	to be decided (Seawater)	(To be confirmed)	Not necessary		ecessary
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not n	ecessary
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
uel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	some of the spent fuel may have been damaged*3		amaged
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray started (freshwater)	Continued water injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater) Hydrogen from the pool exploded on Mar. 15th	Pool cooling capa	bility was recovered
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 1 and 2.) (Lightin			o loss of AC power e control room at Unit 3 and 4.)	Not damag	ed (estimate)
Environmental effect	Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: 0.53mSV/h at the south side of the office building, 71 µ Sv/h at the Main gate, 29 µ Sv/h at the West gate, as of 15:00, Apr. 14th Small amount of plutonium was detected from the soil sampled at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site.(3/21, 22, 25 28). Radioactive materials were detected from underground water sampled near the turbine buildings. (3/30). There is highly radioactively contaminated water accumulated on the basement of Unit 2 turbine building and in the concrete tunnel for piping outside the building. Radioactive materials exceeding the regulatory limit have been detected from seawater sample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS since Mar. 21st. I=131detected at near the discharge outlet of unit-2 is 2500 times as much as legal limit.(4/12) TEPCO and MEXT has expanded the monitoring for the surrounding sea area since Apr 4th. Influence to the people's life Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tay water sampled in some prefectures. Small sho caught in waters off the coast of Ibaraki on Apr. 4 have been found to contain radioactive ceisum and iodine above the legal limit.(4/5) Small amount of strontium was detected from some sameles of soil and plants taken in the area that is 20-80 km far from the power station. Radioactive of the inform NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 11:20, Mar. 12th) <					
		n the expanded evacuation area mentione	ed above, are asked to get prepared for staying in	pected to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zor adoors or evacuation in an emergency (issued on Apr. 1		ate within a month or
NES (estimated by NISA)	total amount of radioactive substance release	ed to the environment at this accident is	1 tenth as much as it at Chernobyl accident so	Level 3 *2	_	
Remarks	 Progress of the work to recover injection function High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore originally installed pumps for injection at unit-1,2 and 3. Discharging radioactive water in the basement of the buildings of Unit 1through 3 continue to improve this situation. High radioactively contaminated water accumulated inside the concrete tunnel for piping outside the building is being transferred to the condenser at Unit 2 as of Apr. 13. It has been confirmed that water level in the trench has gone down since the transfer started. Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioactive material found outside. NISA announced that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness because of low pressure inside the pressure vessel. NISA told that it is unlikely that these are cracks or holes in the reactor pressure vessel has hardly risen for the past a few days and leakage of the vessel is suspected. The same measure will be taken for Unit 2 and 3. Cooling the spent fuel pool Steam like substance rose intermittently from the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or spraying water to the spent fuel pool has been conducted. Prevention of the proliferation of contaminated dust: Testing the spraying synthetic resin to contain contaminated dust began on Apr. 1st. 					

Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release (-4/12 17:00), Press conference

NISA: News Release $(-4/14\ 08:00)$, Press conference

INES: International Nuclear Event Scale NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

*3 It is presumed that some of the spent fuel may have been damaged based on radioactive substance detected from the water sample taken from the pool of unit-4.


Low High

Severe (Need immediate

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)			1100 / 3293	
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation where the start of the unit into cold shutdown state one by No parameter has shown abnormality after the Latest Monitor Indication: 2.5μ Sv/h at 21:00, Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS	quake. While injecting water into the r r one. e earthquake occurred off an shore of	reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system	n, TEPCO recovered the core coolin

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station		
Unit	1 2 3		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.		
Remarks	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.		

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown	
Status	In cold shutdown.	
Remarks No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, A		




Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.

Nuclear Power Plant Safety and rela	ited items		Parameters in the
Reactor Shutdown			→ Operation Status at the eart
Safety y		Г	Core cooling requiring AC power (Large volumetric freshwater in
Cooling	Design base cooling capability		Core cooling requiring AC power (Cooling through Heat Exchange
Containment		ign base 5 Barriers	
	Fur	©Fuel Pellet ©Cladding Tube	Core and Fuel Integrity
		③Reactor Pressure vessel	Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrit
		@Containment Vessel —	Containment Vessel Integrity
		⑤Reactor Building	Building Integrity
<accident :="" am="" management=""></accident>			Iinjection to core (AM)
	Alternative Cooling	tion for containment vessel	Injection to Containment Vessel
2		tion against burst	Containment Venting (AM)
Safety of the spent fuel pool]	Г	Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel p (Fuel Damage)
]	L	Cooling of the spent fuel pool (Water injection, pool temp, water
Work environment in main control room]		
Work environment in main control room Environmental effect	 }		Main Control Room Habitability (ventiration, Lights, Indicator)





Accidents of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations

1. Latest Major event and response

April 12th:

Apr. 13th:

15:02 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated water accumulated inside concrete tunnel was stopped at Unit 2. About 660 tons of water has been transferred.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations (1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4
	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of		11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel
Major Incidents and Actions	power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	power)	Storage Pool increased at 84°C
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15 occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)
	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting	
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion	
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h	
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fue pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked	
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)	
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	
	to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2) 31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	surge tank Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor	
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	leakage from the pit near the intake 2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the conden4er to	started. 28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST	
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main	the CST Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is	to the surge tank	
	condenser to the CST completed.	closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped		
		Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.		
		Apr. 12th 19:35 Transmission of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated inside trench outside the turbine building to the condenser started at Unit 2		
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source			
	Reactor Water level (Apr. 14 00:00)	Reactor Water level (Apr. 14 00:00)	Reactor Water level (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>)	Thermography (Apr. 12 07:50)
Major Data ^	(A) <u>-1600mm</u> (B) <u>-1600mm</u>	-1500mm	(A) -1750mm, (B) <u>-2250mm</u>	SFP: 37°C
	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 14 00:00</u>) (A) <u>0.423MPaG</u> , (B) <u>0.940MPaG</u>	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 14 00:00</u>) (A) -0.016MPaG, (B) -0.020MPaG	Reactor pressure (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>) (A) <u>-0.017MPaG</u> , (B) <u>-0.083MPaG</u>	
	CV pressure (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>) 0.190MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>) 0.095MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>) <u>0.1047MPaabs</u>	
	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>)	RPV temperature (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>)	RPV temperature (<u>Apr. 14 00:00</u>)	
	203.6°C at feed water line nozzle	<u>159.7°C</u> at feed water line nozzle	<u>90.4°C</u> at feed water line nozzle	
	(to be confirmed)	Water temperature in SFP (Apr. <u>14 00:00</u>) <u>72.0°C</u>	(to be confirmed)	
	Thermography (Apr. 12 07:50) CV: 17°C, SFP: 26°C	Thermography (Apr. 12 07:30) Top of R/B: 28°C	Thermography (Apr. 12 07:50) CV: 21°C, SFP: 59°C	

(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

1th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

*Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page; "http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special_4.html".

Abbreviations:

SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator **RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel** R/B: Reactor Building RHR: Residual Heat Removal system CST: Condensate water Storage Tank




	Unit-5 and 6
	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
е	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6
	radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
	Water temperature of SFP
	Unit 5 <u>35.3°C (Apr. 14 06:00)</u> Unit 6 <u>29.5°C (Apr. 14 06:00)</u>

(as of 08:00, April 14th)

Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

The accident that brings environmental impact is going on at several units in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power Station after the earthquake occured on March 11th. Other nuclear power plants in Japan are in normal operation or safely shutdown.



Tomari 1 2 3

