Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 10:00, April 11th (Estimated by JAIF)

Power Station Unit Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)						
	1	2	Fukushima Dai−ichi Nuclear Pov I	ver Station 4	5	<u> </u>
Liectric / Triermal Fower output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 /3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
	Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (70%*)	Damaged (30%*)	Damaged (25%*)	No fuel rods	Not Da	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Da	
	t Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Da	maged
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functional	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary		hutdown)
	Severely Damaged Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the ro explo	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel Fuel	exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Sa	fe
Vessel after incre	increasing / Decreased a little asing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	Sa	fe
Lightainment Veccel Preceire	d a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Sa	fe
Water injection to core (Accident Management) Continuir	ng (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not ned	cessary
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	(To be confirmed)	to be decided (Seawater)	(To be confirmed)	Not necessary	Not ned	essary
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not ned	essary
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	Possibly damaged	Not Da	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool Water	spray started (ffreshwater)	Continued water injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater) Hydrogen from the pool exploded on Mar. 15th	Pool cooling capab	ility was recovered
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of (Lighting working in the contr			loss of AC power control room at Unit 3 and 4.)	Not damage	d (estimate)
Radiation lever Plutonium was Radioactive in Radio	Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: 0.61mSv/h at the south side of the office building, 85 # Sv/h at the Main gate, 36 # Sv/h at the West gate, as of 21:00, Apr. 10th Plutonium was detected from the soil sampled at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site on Mar. 21st, 22nd, 25th and 28th. The amount is so small that the Pu is not harmful to human body. Radioactive materials were detected from underground water sampled near the turbine buildings on Mar. 30th. Radioactive materials exceeding the regulatory limit have been detected from seawater sample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS since Mar. 21st. On Apr. 5th, 7.5 million times the legal limit of radioactive iodine, I−131, was detected from the seawater, which had been sampled near the water intake of Unit 2 on Apr. 2nd. It was found on Apr. 2nd that there was highly radioactive (more than 1000mSv/hr) water in the concrete pit housing electrical cables and this water was leaking into the sea through cracks on the concrete wall. It was confirmed on Apr. 6th that the leakage of water stopped after injecting a hardening agent into holes described the low level radioactive waster release, TEPCO evaluated that eating fish and seaweed caught near the plant every day for a year would add some 25% of the dose that the general pubic receive from the environment for a year. TEPCO and MEXT has expanded the monitoring for the surrounding sea area since Apr. 4th. ■ Influence to the people's life Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tay water sampled in some prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment (21st−) and intake (23rd−) for some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tay water sampled in some prefectures from Mar. 21st to 27th. Small fish caught in waters off the coast of laraki ion Apr. 4 have been found to contain radioactive cesium above the legal limit on Apr. 5th. It was decided on Apr. 5th that as a legal limit of					
INES (estimated by NISA)	ion advisory should be issued to Level 5	o prevent residents from exposed to a Level 5	total of 20 mSv a year. Level 5	Level 3	_	_
● Progress of Water injecti	Progress of the work to recover injection function Water injection to the reactor pressure vessel by temporally installed pumps were switched from seawater to freshwater at Unit 1, 2 and 3. High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore originally installed pumps for injection. Discharging radioactive water in the basement of the buildings of Unit 1through 3 continue to improve this situation. Water transfer work is being made to secure a place the water to go. Lighting in the turbine buildings became partly available at Unit 1through 4. Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioactive material found outside. NISA announced that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness because of low pressure inside the pressure vessel. NISA told that it is unlikely that these are cracks or holes in the reactor pressure vessels at the same occasion. TEPCO started to inject nitrogen gas into the Unit 1 containment vessel to reduce the possibility of hydrogen explosion on Apr. 6th. The same measure will be taken for Unit 2 and 3. Cooling the spent fuel pool Steam like substance rose intermittently from the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or spraying water to the spent fuel pool has been conducted. Prevention of the proliferation of contaminated dust: Testing the spraying synthetic resin to contaminated dust began on Apr. 1st.					
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[Abbreviations]
Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release (-4/10 17:00), Press conference
NISA: News Release (-4/10 15:30), Press conference
TEPCO: Press Release (-4/9 21:00), Press Conference
TEPCO: NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan MEXT: Minstry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology *TEPCO's estimation based on the radiation level in the CV

[Significance judged by JAIF]

Low High

■ Severe (Need immediate action)


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3	4	
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293				
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown				
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	_	Level 3	
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. Latest Monitor Indication: 2.8 \(\mu \) Sv/h at 21:00, Apr. 10th at NPS border Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS				

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1 2 3			
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
Remarks	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. Now 2 external power lines are available. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.			

Power Station	Tokai Dai−ni		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown		
Status	In cold shutdown.		
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.		

Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.



1. Latest Major event and response

April 9th:

03:29 Nitrogen injection valve was closed in order to switch to the high purity nitrogen gas generator. (04:10 The valve was reopened.)
13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST was completed at Unit 2.

09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST was completed at Unit 1.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6	
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power) 11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of p		11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6	
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15 occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.	
	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.	
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6	
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.	
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting			
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)			
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion			
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h			
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked			
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	21st 18:22 White, steam-like smoke erupted from the top of the rector building.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.			
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)			
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available			
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.			
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank			
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condenser to the CST				
		Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6				
		05:38 It was confirmed that the highly radioactive water flow mentioned above stopped.)				
		Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.				
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water inje	ection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to or	iginally equipped power source			
Major Data	Reactor Water level (<u>Apr. 10 10:00</u>)	Reactor Water level (Apr. 10 10:00)	Reactor Water level (Apr. 10 06:00)	Thermography (Apr. 08 07:30) SFP: 46°C	Water temperature of SFP	
	(A) -1600mm (B) -1700mm Reactor pressure (Apr. 10 10:00)	-1450mm Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 10 10:00</u>) (A) -0.020MPaG, (B) -0.025MPaG	(A) -1900mm, (B) -2250mm Reactor pressure (Apr. 10 06:00)	SFP: 40 C	Unit 5 36.4°C (Apr. 10 11:00) Unit 6 31°C (Apr. 10 11:00)	
	(A) <u>0.413MPaG</u> , (B) <u>0.858MPaG</u> CV pressure (<u>Apr. 10 10:00</u>) 0.195MPaabs	CV pressure (<u>Apr. 10 10:00</u>) 0.095MPaabs	(A) <u>-0.009MPaG</u> , (B) <u>-0.077MPaG</u> CV pressure (Apr. 10 06:00) 0.1061MPaabs			
	RPV temperature (Apr. 10 10:00) 227.1°C at feed water line nozzle (to be confirmed)	RPV temperature (Apr. 10 10:00) _149.6°C at feed water line nozzle Water temperature in SFP (Apr. 10 10:00)	RPV temperature (Apr. 10 06:00) 91.7°C at feed water line nozzle (to be confirmed)			
	Thermography (Apr. 08 07:30) CV: 33°C, SFP: 23°C	47.0°C Thermography (Apr. 08 07:30) Top of R/B: 30°C	Thermography (Apr. 08 07:30) CV: 35°C, SFP: 56°C		1	

(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house 12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house 25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate *SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel

R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system CST: Condensate water Storage Tank



Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

