

Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 16:00, April 7th (Estimated by JAIF)

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station					
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 / 3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	In Service → Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (70%*)	Damaged (30%*)	Damaged (25%*)	No fuel rods	Not Damaged	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functional	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functioning (in cold shutdown)	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Safe	
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	Safe	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Safe	
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	(To be confirmed)	to be decided (Seawater)	(To be confirmed)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporarily stopped	Temporarily stopped	Temporarily stopped	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	Possibly damaged	Not Damaged	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray started (ffreshwater)	Continued water injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater) Hydrogen from the pool exploded on Mar. 15th	Pool cooling capability was recovered	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 1 and 2.)		Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 3 and 4.)		Not damaged (estimate)	
Environmental effect	<p>● Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: 0.70mSv/h at the south side of the office building, 46 μSv/h at the West gate, as of 09:00, Apr. 7th, 108 μSv/h at the Main gate, as of 10:00, Apr. 6th. Radiation dose higher than 1000 mSv was measured at the surface of water accumulated on the basement of Unit 2 turbine building and in the tunnel for laying piping outside the building on Mar. 27th. Plutonium was detected from the soil sampled at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site on Mar. 21st, 22nd, 25th and 28th. The amount is so small that the Pu is not harmful to human body. Radioactive materials exceeding the regulatory limit have been detected from seawater sample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS since Mar. 21st. On Apr. 5th, 7.5 million times the legal limit of radioactive iodine, I-131, was detected from the seawater, which had been sampled near the water intake of Unit 2 on Apr. 2nd. It was found on Apr. 2nd that there was highly radioactive (more than 1000mSv/hr) water in the concrete pit housing electrical cables and this water was leaking into the sea through cracks on the concrete wall. It was confirmed on Apr. 6th that the leakage of water stopped after injecting a hardening agent into holes drilled around the pit. Release of some 10,000 tons of low level radioactive wastewater into the sea began on Apr. 4th, in order to make room for the highly radioactive water mentioned above. Regarding the influence of the low level radioactive waste release, TEPCO evaluated that eating fish and seaweed caught near the plant every day for a year would add some 25% of the dose that the general public receive from the environment for a year. <u>Monitoring for the surrounding sea area has been enhanced since Apr. 4th.</u> Radioactive materials were detected from underground water sampled near the turbine buildings on Mar. 30th.</p> <p>● Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk and agricultural products from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment (21st-) and intake (23rd-) for some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures from Mar. 21st to 27th. Small fish caught in waters off the coast of Ibaraki on Apr. 4 have been found to contain radioactive cesium above the legal limit on Apr. 5th. It was decided on Apr. 5th that as a legal limit of radioactive iodine, the same amount for vegetables should be applied to fishery products for the time being.</p>					
Evacuation	<p><1> Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) <2> Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) <3> Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS ※NSC is suggesting the government revise the current radioactive standards for evacuation, according to which evacuation is only considered when radiation levels reach 50 mSv about one week after any accidents, such that evacuation advisory should be issued to prevent residents from exposed to a total of 20 mSv a year.</p>					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 5	Level 5	Level 5	Level 3	—	—
Remarks	<p>● Progress of the work to recover injection function Water injection to the reactor pressure vessel by temporarily installed pumps were switched from seawater to freshwater at Unit 1, 2 and 3. High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore originally installed pumps for injection. Discharging radioactive water in the basement of the buildings of Unit 1through 3 continue to improve this situation. Water transfer work is being made to secure a place the water to go. Lighting in the turbine buildings became partly available at Unit 1through 4.</p> <p>● Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioactive material found outside. NISA announced that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness because of low pressure inside the pressure vessel. NISA told that it is unlikely that these are cracks or holes in the reactor pressure vessels at the same occasion. TEPCO started to inject nitrogen gas into the Unit 1containment vessel to reduce the possibility of hydrogen explosion on Apr. 6th. The same measure will be taken for Unit 2 and 3.</p> <p>● Cooling the spent fuel pool Steam like substance rose intermittently from the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or spraying water to the spent fuel pool has been conducted.</p> <p>● Prevention of the proliferation of contaminated dust: Testing the spraying synthetic resin to contain contaminated dust began on Apr. 1st.</p>					

[Source]
Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release (-4/5 19:00), Press conference
NISA: News Release (-4/7 08:00), Press conference
TEPCO: Press Release (-4/7 12:00), Press Conference

[Abbreviations]
INES: International Nuclear Event Scale
NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

*TEPCO's estimation based on the radiation level in the CV

[Significance judged by JAIF]
■ Low
■ High
■ Severe (Need immediate action)


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293			
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. Latest Monitor Indication: <u>3.1 μSv/h</u> at 09:00, Apr. 7th at NPS border Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS			

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station		
Unit	1	2	3
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.		
Remarks	Safe		

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni	
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown	
Status	In cold shutdown.	
Remarks	Safe	

Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.





1. Latest Major event and response

April 5th:
 About 7.5 million times the legal limit of radioactive iodine, I-131, was detected from samples of seawater, which had been collected at 11:50 on Apr. 2nd, near the water intake of Unit 2.
 15:07 A hardening agent was injected into holes drilled around the pit of Unit 2 in a bid to stem the flow of highly radioactive water into the sea.
 April 6th:
 05:38 It was confirmed that the highly radioactive water flow mentioned above stopped.
 22:30 TEPCO started operation for injecting nitrogen gas into the Unit 1 containment vessel to reduce the possibility of hydrogen explosion.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
<i>*The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness</i>	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting		
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)		
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion		
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked		
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	21st 18:22 White, steam-like smoke erupted from the top of the reactor building.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)		
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available		
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.		
		Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		
		2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condenser to the CST	Apr. 2nd 9:52-12:54 Spray water to the SFP		
	3rd 13:47 Poured a polymer absorbent as a measure for stopping the water leakage from the pit (no effect)				
	4th 11:05 Start water injection to SFP using temporary motor driven pump				
	6th 22:30 Start operation for injecting nitrogen into CV				
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source				
Major Data	Reactor Water level (Apr. 07 06:00) (A) -1650mm (B) -1650mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. 07 06:00) -1500mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. 07 06:00) (A) -1850mm, (B) -2250mm		Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 34.8°C (Apr. 07 06:00) Unit 6 21.5°C (Apr. 07 06:00)
	Reactor pressure (Apr. 07 06:00) (A) 0.363MPaG, (B) 0.758MPaG	Reactor pressure (Apr. 07 06:00) (A) -0.018MPaG, (B) -0.025MPaG	Reactor pressure (Apr. 07 06:00) (A) -0.002MPaG, (B) -0.079MPaG		
	CV pressure (Apr. 07 06:00) 0.155MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. 07 06:00) 0.100MPaabs	CV pressure (Apr. 07 06:00) 0.1075MPaabs		
	RPV temperature (Apr. 07 06:00) 216.3°C at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (Apr. 07 06:00) 144.2°C at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (Apr. 07 06:00) 83.4°C at feed water line nozzle (under repair)		
		Water temperature in SFP (Apr. 07 06:00) 48.0°C			

(2) Fukushima Dai-ri NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

*SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool
 EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator
 RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel
 R/B: Reactor Building
 RHR: Residual Heat Removal system
 CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ri NPS)
 12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house
 12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate
 12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate
 12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate
 15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house
 25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

The accident that brings environmental impact is going on at several units in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power Station after the earthquake occurred on March 11th. Other nuclear power plants in Japan are in normal operation or safely shutdown.

