Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima



Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation

This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.

JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 16:00, April 4th (Estimated by JAIF)

Power Station Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station						
Unit	1	2	2	A	5 6	
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381		
·	BWR-3				784 / 2381 1100 / 3293	
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged	Damaged	Damaged	No fuel rods	Not Damaged	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Not Damaged (estimation)	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not damaged (estimation)	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functional	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functioning (in cold shutdown)	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Slightly Damaged	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydroge explosion	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Saf	e
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Decreased a little after increasing over 400°C on Mar. 24th	Unknown / Stable	Unknown	Safe	Safe	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Decreased a little after increasing up to 0.4Mpa on Mar. 24th	Stable	Stable	Safe	Saf	е
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	(To be confirmed)	to be decided (Seawater)	(To be confirmed)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	Possibly damaged	Not Dan	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray started (ffreshwater)	Continued water injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continued water spray and injection (Switch from seawater to freshwater) Hydrogen from the pool exploded on Mar. 15th	Pool cooling capability was recovered	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 1 and 2.)		Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting working in the control room at Unit 3 and 4.)		Not damaged	(estimate)
Environmental effect	■ Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: 0.78mSv/h at the south side of the office building, 121 u Sv/h at the Main gate, 55 u Sv/h at the West gate, as of 09:00. Apr. 4rd. Radiation dose higher than 1000 mSv was measured at the surface of water accumulated on the basement of Unit 2 turbine building and in the tunnel for laying piping outside the building on Mar. 27th. Plutonium was detected from the soil of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site on Mar. 28th. The amount is so small that the Pu is not harmful to human body. Radioactive materials exceeding the regulatory limit have been detected from seawater sample collected in the sea surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS since Mar. 21st. Radioactive Iodine, I-131, 4,385 times higher than regulatory limit was detected on Mar. 30th. It is discovered on Apr. 2nd that there is highly radioactive (more than 1000mSv/hr) water in the concrete structure housing electrical cable and this water is leaking into the sea through cracks on the concrete wall. Efforts to stop the water leakage from the crack is being made. Radioactive materials were detected from underground water sampled near the turbine buildings on Mar. 30th. ■ Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk and agricultural products from Fukushima and neighboring prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment (21st-) and intake (23rd-) for some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures from Mar. 21st to 27th. Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan released prediction of radioactive material spread caused by the accident (Mar. 23rd). This prediction was based on the calculation using computer code called SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information).==> http://www.nsc.go.jp/info/110323_top_siryo.pdf					
Evacuation	<1> Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) <2> Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) <3> Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 5	Level 5	Level 5	Level 3	-	
Remarks	Progress of the work to recover injection function Water injection to the reactor pressure vessel by temporally installed pumps were switched from seawater to freshwater at Unit 1, 2 and 3. High radiation circumstance hampering the work to restore originally installed pumps for injection. Discharging radioactive water in the basement of the buildings of Unit 1through 3 continue to improve this situation. Water transfer work is being made to secure a place the water to go. Lighting in the turbine buildings became partly available at Unit 1through 4. Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel may leaked outside at Unit 1, 2 and Unit 3, based on radioactive material found outside. NISA announced that the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 2 and 3 may have lost air tightness because of low pressure inside the pressure vessel. NISA told that it is unlikely that these are cracks or holes in the reactor pressure vessels at the same occation. Cooling the spent fuel pool Steam like substance rose intermittently from the reactor building at Unit 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been observed. Injecting and/or spraying water to the spent fuel pool has been conducted. Prevention of the proliferation of contaminated dust: Testing the spraying synthetic resin to contaminated dust began on Apr. 1st.					

[Source]

Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters: News Release ($-4/4\ 08:00$), Press conference NISA: News Release ($-4/4\ 08:00$), Press conference TEPCO: Press Release ($-4/4\ 09:00$), Press Conference

[Abbreviations]

INES: International Nuclear Event Scale NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. [Significance judged by JAIF]

Low High

Severe (Need immediate action)


Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station					
Jnit	1	2	3	4		
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293					
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service → Automatic Shutdown					
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.					
NES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	_	Level 3		
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. Latest Monitor Indication: 3.6 \(\mu\) Sv/h at \(\text{09:00, Apr. 4th}\) at NPS border Evacuation Area: 10km from NPS					

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station				
Unit	1	2	3		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown				
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.				
Remarks	Safe				

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni		
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	In cold shutdown.		
Remarks	Safe		

Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.



Accidents of Fukushima Dai-ichi and Fukushima-Dai-ni Nuclear Power Stations

(as of 08:00, April 4th)

1. Latest Major event and response

April 2nd:

09:30 It was found at Unit 2 that radioactive water of over 1000 mSv/h radiation level pooled in the pit that contains power cables near the reactor's water intake and the water was seeping from the some 20cm crack in the wall of the pit into the sea. 16:25 Effort to stop leakage of radioactive water from the pit near the water intake was started by injecting concrete into the pit.

April 3rd:

12:18 Power supply to water injection pumps to the reactors of Unit 1, 2, and 3 was switched from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source.

13:47 A polymer absorbent was poured into a duct as a measure for stopping the water leakage from the pit of Unit 2.

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS						
	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6	
Major Incidents and Actions	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84°C	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6	
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15 occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.	
Preparedness	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.	
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit –6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5	
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	condenser.	
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting			
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)			
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion			
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h			
		Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked			
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	21st 18:22 White, steam-like smoke erupted from the top of the rector building.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.			
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)			
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available			
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.			
		Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank			
		2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condenser to the CST	Apr. 2nd 9:52-12:54 Spray water to the SFP			
		3rd 14:05 Poured a polymer absorbent as a measure for stopping the water leakage from the pit (no effect)				
Major Data	Reactor Water level (<u>Apr. 4 00:00</u>) (A) -1650mm (B) -1650mm	Reactor Water level (Apr. 04 00:00) -1500mm	Reactor Water level (<u>Apr. 04 03:30</u>) (A) <u>-1800mm</u> , (B) -2250mm	Thermography (Apr. 03 07:50) 42°C (SFP Temp.)	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 30.9°C (Apr. 03 16:00)	
	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 4 00:00</u>) (A) <u>0.304MPaG</u> , (B) <u>0.592MPaG</u>	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 04 00:00</u>) (A) <u>-0.011MPaG</u> , (B) <u>-0.014MPaG</u>	Reactor pressure (<u>Apr. 04 03:30</u>) (A) <u>0.007MPaG</u> , (B) <u>-0.081MPaG</u>		Unit 6 30.5°C (Apr. 03 16:00)	
	CV pressure (<u>Apr. 04 00:00</u>) 0.155MPaabs	CV pressure (<u>Apr. 04 00:00</u>) 0.105MPaabs	CV pressure (<u>Apr. 04 03:30</u>) <u>0.1073MPaab</u> s			
	RPV temperature (Apr. 04 00:00) 243.1°C at feed water line nozzle	Water temperature of SFP (Apr. 03 14:00) 56.0°C	Water level in trench (Apr. 01st 11:00) -155cm to floor level			
		Water level in trench (Apr. 01st 11:00) -104cm to floor level	Thermography (Apr. 03 07:50) 56°C (SFP Temp.)			
	Thermography (Apr. 03 07:50) 25°C (SFP Temp.)	TO TOTAL TO HOOF HOVE	OU O (OLIT TOTTP)			

(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs

All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration

11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)

12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order

11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house 12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate

12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate

15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house

25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

*SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool

EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel

R/B: Reactor Building

RHR: Residual Heat Removal system

CST: Condensate water Storage Tank

Status of the Nuclear Power Plants after the Earthquake

