Information on Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Fukushima

Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Policy on information and compilation
This JAIF-compiled information chart represents the situation, phenomena, and operations in which JAIF estimates and guesses the reactors and related facilities are, based on the latest data and information directly and indirectly made available by the relevant organizations when JAIF's updating works done. Consequently, JAIF may make necessary changes to descriptions in the chart, once (1) new developments have occurred in the status of reactors and facilities and (2) JAIF has judged so needed after reexamining the prior information and judgments.
JAIF will do its best to keep tracks on the information on the nuclear power plants quickly and accurately.

Status of nuclear power plants in Fukushima as of 12:00, June 4th (Estimated by JAIF)

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station					
Unit	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	460 / 1380	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	784 / 2381	1100 /3293
Type of Reactor	BWR-3	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-4	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	In Service -> Shutdown	Outage	Outage	Outage
Fuel assemblies loaded in Core	400	548	548	No fuel rods	548	764
Core and Fuel Integrity (Loaded fuel assemblies)	Damaged (core melt*2)	Damaged (core melt*2)	Damaged (core melt*2)	No fuel rods	Not Damaged	
Reactor Pressure Vessel structural integrity	Limited Damage and Leakage	Unknown	Unknown	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Containment Vessel structural integrity	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Damage and Leakage Suspected	Not Damaged	Not Damaged	
Core cooling requiring AC power 1 (Large volumetric freshwater injection)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functional	
Core cooling requiring AC power 2 (Cooling through Heat Exchangers)	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not Functional	Not necessary	Functioning (in cold shutdown)	
Building Integrity	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Partly opened	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Severely Damaged (Hydrogen Explosion)	Open a vent hole on the rooftop for avoiding hydrogen explosion	
Water Level of the Rector Pressure Vessel	Lower than the bottom of fuels	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Fuel exposed partially or fully	Safe	Safe	
Pressure / Temperature of the Reactor Pressure Vessel	Gradually increasing / Gradually decreasing	Unknown / Stable	Unknown / Gradually decreasing after an increase	Safe	Safe	
Containment Vessel Pressure	Stable	Stable	Stable	Safe	Safe	
Water injection to core (Accident Management)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Continuing (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Water injection to Containment Vessel (AM)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Feed water to fill up the CV (planned)	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Containment Venting (AM)	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Temporally stopped	Not necessary	Not necessary	
Fuel assemblies stored in Spent Fuel Pool	292	587	514	1331	946	876
Fuel Integrity in the spent fuel pool	Unknown	Unknown	Damage Suspected	No severe damage suspected*1	Not Damaged	
Cooling of the spent fuel pool	Water spray and injection continues (freshwater)	Switching from freshwater injection to circulation cooling with a heat exchanger	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Water spray and injection continues (Switch from seawater to freshwater)	Pool cooling capability was recovered	
Main Control Room Habitability & Operability	Poor due to loss of AC power (Lighting and parmaeter monitoring restored in the control room at Unit 1 and 3 on Mar. 24th, at Unit 2 on Mar. 26th, at Unit 4 on Mar. 29th)				Not damaged (estimate)	
Environmental effect	●Status in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS site Radiation level: 365 μSv/h at the south side of the office building, 14 μSv/h at the West gate, as of 09:00, June 4th, 42 μSv/h at the Main gate, as of 10:30, May 21st. Some radioactive nuclides (I, Cs, Pu, Am Cm and Sr) has been detected in soil sampled at the Fukushima site. Radioactive materials have been detected in samples corrected from underground water and also sea water at or near the site. Environmental monitoring has been enhanced. Radioactive Iodine and cesium have been detected in the marine soil sample taken ●Influence to the people's life Radioactive material was detected from milk, agricultural products and seafood from Fukushima and nearby prefectures. The government issued order to limit shipment and intake of some products. Radioactive iodine, exceeding the provisional legal limit for drinking water, was detected from tap water sampled in some prefectures. All the restrictions of intake of the water, which was once issued by the government, have been lifted by May 10th. Radioactive cesium was detected in sludge at sewage treatment plants, one of which is 50 km far from the power station. Small amount of strontium was detected in some samples of soil and plants collected in the area 20-80 km away from the power station. Radioactive Cs above the legal limits have been detected in tea leaves harvested in some prefectures. Shipments of these tea leaves were stopped voluntarily. (5/13-) Radioactive Iodine and cesium have been detected in the seabed samples taken 15-20 km far from the plant from 15-20m deep. (5/4) Radioactive cesium was also detected in marine soil in the sea off the coast, 10-30km far from the nearby prefectures.					
Evacuation	<1> Shall be evacuated for within 3km from NPS, Shall stay indoors for within 10km from NPS (issued at 21:23, Mar. 11th) <2> Shall be evacuated for within 10km from NPS (issued at 05:44, Mar. 12th) <3> Shall be evacuated for within 20km from NPS (issued at 18:25, Mar. 12th) <4> Shall stay indoors (issued at 11:00, Mar. 15th), Should consider leaving (issued at 11:30, Mar. 25th) for from 20km to 30km from NPS <5>The 20km evacuation zone around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to be expanded so as to include the area, where annual radiation exposure is expected to be above 20mSv. People in the expanded zone are ordered to evacuate within a month or so. People living in the 20 to 30km and other than the expanded evacuation area mentioned above, are asked to get prepared for staying indoors or evacuation in an emergency (announced on Apr. 11th and issued on Apr. 22nd).					
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 7 ※Cumulative amount of radioactivity from Fukushima Diichi NPS has reached the level to be classified as level 7. Total amount of radioactive materials released to the environment in this accident is one tenth as much as one in the Chernobyl accident so far.		Level 3 *2	—	—	
Remarks	●Progress of the work to restore cooling function TEPCO announced its plan to bring the damaged reactors to stable condition known as "cold shutdown" in about 6 to 9 months, a situation in which water temperatures inside the reactors have been stably brought below 100 C.(4/17, revised on 5/17) High radiation circumstance is hampering the work to restore reactor cooling function. Transferring the radioactive water in the basement of the buildings and concrete tunnels outside the buildings continues at Unit 2 and 3 (U2: 4/19-5/26, U3: 5/17-5/25, now suspended). TEPCO announced its plan to decontaminate and store the highly radioactive water which has been accumulating in the buildings of Unit 1 throuhg 4 and the waste process facilities. Works inside the reactor bldg have been available since the air purification system installed. Emergency power generators were moved to higher ground in order to prevent the reactors' cooling systems from failing in case of major tsunami hits. External power source becomes more reliable after connecting 3 power lines with each other, which are for Unit 1/2, for Unit 3/ 4 and for Unit 5/6. TEPCO confirmed that water level inside the No1 reactor pressure vessel is out of scale on the lower side. TEPCO conducted data analysis and estimated that fuel pellets melted and dropped to the reactor pressure vessel at unit 1. TEPCO illustrated possibility of fuel pellet melting and doping to the bottom also at unit 2 and 3. However, TEPCO believes that an event with large amount of radioactive material release is not likely to happen in the future since the reactors have been continuously cooled by means of water injection.*2 TEPCO has been working to create a system to decontaminate and circulate water back into the reactors to cool them down since TEPCP revised the plan after confirming some damage to the reactor pressure vessel and the containment vessel at unit 1. TEPCO is conducting seismic assessment for the damaged reactor bldg of unit 1, 2, 3 and 4. It is confirmed that the reactor bldgs of unit 1 and 4 holds enough seismic resistance. ●Function of containing radioactive material It is presumed that radioactive material inside the reactor vessel is leaking outside. High concentration of radioactive cesium, higher than two million Bq/cc, was detected from the accumulated water in the basement of Unit 1. Nitrogen gas injection into the Unit 1containment vessel to prevent hydrogen explosion started on April 6th and continues. Preparation work for covering the reactor building was started at Unit 1 (5/13). ●Cooling the spent fuel pool (SFP) Injecting and/or spraying water to the SFP continues for the purpose of cooling and making up water evaporated. Corrosion inhibitor, Hydrazine (H2NNH2), has been added to injected water. (5/9-). Work for structural reinforcement to support the SFP is in progress at unit 4 prior to heat exchanger insulation for SFP cooling. Cooling the Unit 2 SFP using newly installed heat exchangers has started on May 31st. ●Prevention of the proliferation of radioactively contaminated substance: TEPCO announced the plans to prevent radioactively contaminated water, dust and soil and radioactive material itself existing on site from spreading on Apr 17. Spraying synthetic resin on the ground and the floors of the buildings to contain contaminated dust continues. Construction work for installing a circulation seawater purifying system, which purifies highly radioactive seawater near the reactors' water intakes, has begun on May 30th. ●Worker's exposure dose: 30 workers has been exposed to radiation more than 100 mSv as of 5/11. It was found that two plant operators had taken in high level of radioactive iodine into the body. Evaluation made by a research institute shows that their exposure dose is somewhere between 200mSv and 580mSv. *Emergency exposure dose limit has been set to 250mSv.					

[Source]
Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters:
News Release (-5/23 17:00), Press conference
NISA: News Release (-6/3 12:00), Press conference
TEPCO: Press Release (-6/4 09:00), Press Conference

[Abbreviations]
MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
INES: International Nuclear Event Scale
NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
NSC: Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

*1 TEPCO estimated that severe damage of spent fuels is not likely in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool after examing the radioactive substance detected from the pool and some pictures of the pool. (4/13, 28, 29)
*2 TEPCO announced the results of the core damage analyses of Unit 1through 3 (5/15, 23).

[Significance judged by JAIF]
Low
High
Severe (Need immediate action)

Power Station	Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station			
Unit	1	2	3	4
Electric / Thermal Power output (MW)	1100 / 3293			
Type of Reactor	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5	BWR-5
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown			
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.			
INES (estimated by NISA)	Level 3	Level 3	—	Level 3
Remarks	Unit-1, 2, 3 & 4, which were in full operation when the earthquake occurred, all shutdown automatically. External power supply was available after the quake. While injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel using make-up water system, TEPCO recovered the core cooling function and made the unit into cold shutdown state one by one. No parameter has shown abnormality after the earthquake occurred off an shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. Latest Monitor Indication: 1.6 μ Sv/h at 09:00, June 4th at NPS border Evacuation Area: 3km from NPS(3/12 7:45), 10km from NPS(3/12 17:39), 8km from NPS(4/21)			

Power Station	Onagawa Nuclear Power Station		
Unit	1	2	3
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown		
Status	All the units are in cold shutdown.		
Remarks	3 out of 4 external power lines in service with another line under construction broke down after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th. All 5 external power lines have become available by Apr. 10th. Monitoring posts' readings have shown no abnormality. All SFP cooling systems had been restored after shutting down due to the earthquake.		

Power Station	Tokai Dai-ni
Operation Status at the earthquake occurred	In Service -> Automatic Shutdown
Status	In cold shutdown.
Remarks	No abnormality has been found after an earthquake occurred off the shore of Miyagi prefecture at 23:32, Apr. 7th.

Parameters in the Table

JAIF picks up these parameters to evaluate safety condition of the nuclear plants during this accident from the view point of the principles of nuclear power plant safety, which are "Shutdown", "Cooling" and "Containment". Then we create the chart. The following diagram is to show the correspondence relation of these parameters in the table to nuclear power plant safety.



Accidents of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations

as of 12:00, June 3rd

1. Latest Major event and response

June 2nd
12:50 Transfer of water in the main steam condenser to the CST started at Unit 3 to make a room for receiving the water accumulating in the basement of Unit 3 T/B.
14:00- Water accumulating in the basement of Unit 6 T/B was transferred to a makeshift tank.
09:00-14:00 Operation of spraying synthetic resin was conducted to prevent scatter of radioactive materials.
09:00-16:00 Operation of removing rubble with remotely controlled heavy machine was conducted

2. Chronology of Nuclear Power Stations

(1) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

	Unit 1		Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit-5 and 6
Major Incidents and Actions **The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness*	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	11th 15:42 Report IAW Article 10* (Loss of power)	14th 04:08 Water temperature in Spent Fuel Storage Pool increased at 84℃	19th 05:00 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 5 19th 22:14 Cooling SFP with RHR-pump started at Unit 6
	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	11th 16:36 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Incapability of water injection by core cooling function)	12th 20:41 Start venting	15th 09:38 Fire occurred on 3rd floor (extinguished spontaneously)	
	12th 00:49 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	13th 11:00 Start venting	13th 05:10 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	16th 05:45 Fire occurred (extinguished spontaneously)	20th 14:30 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 5. 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown achieved at Unit 6.
	12th 14:30 Start venting	14th 13:25 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Loss of reactor cooling functions)	13th 08:41 Start venting	Since 20th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.	22nd 19:41 All power source was switched to external AC power at Unit 5 and 6.
	12th 15:36 Hydrogen explosion	14th 16:34 Seawater injection to RPV	13th 13:12 Seawater injection to RPV	29th 11:50 lights in the main control room becomes available	
	12th 20:20 Seawater injection to RPV	14th 22:50 Report IAW Article 15* (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	14th 05:20 Start venting		Apr. 1st 13:40 Start transferring pooled water in the Unit 6 radioactive waste process facility to the Unit 5 condenser.
	22nd 11:20 RPV temperature increased	15th 00:02 Start venting	14th 07:44 Event falling under Article 15* occurred (Abnormal rise of CV pressure)	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed	
	22nd 02:33 Seawater injection through feed water line started in addition to fire extinguish line	15th 06:10 Sound of explosion, Suppression Pool damage suspected	14th 11:01 Hydrogen explosion	May 5 12:19 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May1 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank started.
	24th 11:30 lights in the main control room becomes available	15th 08:25 White smoke reeked	15th 10:22 Radiation dose 400mSv/h		
	25th 15:37 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	20th 15:05 operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool started.	16th 08:34, 10:00 White smoke reeked	May 6 12:38 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May2 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted. May 2 11:03 The Residual heat removal pump temporally stopped while start up transformer testing
	27th 08:30 Continuing to transfer the water in the basement of the turbine building	26th 10:10 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	Since 17th, operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool continues.		
	31st 09:20-11:25 Work to remove the water in the trench	26th 16:46 lights in the main control room becomes available	21st 15:55 Slightly gray smoke erupted (18:02 settled)	May 7 14:05 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May3 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	31st 12:00 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank (- 15:27, Apr. 2)	29th 16:45 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank	22nd 22:46 lights in the main control room becomes available		
	31st 13:03 Start water injection to SFP	Apr. 2nd 16:25 Start injecting concrete to stop water leakage from the pit near the intake	25th 18:02 Freshwater injection to the reactor started.	May 9 16:05 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May7 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 2nd 17:10 Start transferring water in the condencer to the CST	28th 17:40 Start to transfer the water in the CST to the surge tank		
	Apr. 7th 01:31 Injection of Nitrogen gas started after opening all valves through the line.	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	Apr. 3rd 12:18 Switch power supply for water injection pumps to the RPV from power supply vehicles to originally equipped power source	May 11 16:07 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May9 14:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 10th 09:30 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr. 5th 15:07 Regarding leakage from the pit that is closed to discharge outlet of unit-2, hardening agent was injected to hole dug surrounding the pit. (Apr. 6 05:38 It was confirmed that water flow stopped	Apr. 13 13:50 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 3 and 4 seawater screen completed	May 13 16:04 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May10 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	Apr. 9th 13:10 Transfer of water from the main condenser to the CST completed.	Apr 17 11:30 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	May 15 16:25 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May10 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	Apr 17 16:00 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	Apr. 13th 17:04 Transfer of highly radioactively contaminated wafter accumulated in the trench outside the turbine building to the condenser completed	May 8 12:10 Water injected the SFP by temporally installed motor driven pump conducted.	May 17 16:14 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May11 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	Apr. 29 11:36 The inside of the building was inspected. It was confirmed that there is no water significant leakage from the CV.	Apr. 14 12:20 Installation of silt fences in front of the Unit 1and 2 seawater screen and intake completed	May 9 12:14 Water injected the SFP by originally installed clean up system conducted.	May 19 16:30 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May11 11:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	Apr. 15th 14:15 Installation of steel plate in front of Unit 2 seawater screen completed	May 15 14:33 180kg of boric acid injection to No3 Reactor started.	May 21 16:00 Operation of spraying water to the spent fuel pool with concrete pump truck conducted.	May12 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	May 5 11:32-16:36 Ventilators to clean the highly radioactive air inside the reactor building were installed and started.	Apr 18 13:42 Start investigation of the inside of R/B using a remote-controlled robot.	May 17 10:11 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor increased		May12 10:30 The operation of transferring water accumulated in reactor bldg of unit-6 to the waste processing facility conducted.
	May 11 08:58 N2 injection to the CV temporally stopped while the work for restoring one of external power sources being conducted. It resumed later.	Apr. 19 10:08 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility	May 17 18:04 Start transferring water accumulated in the turbine building and the concrete tunnel to the waste processing facility		May13 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	May 12 05:00 Instrumental reading of the water gage of the reactor No1 went off the scale on the lower side after adjusting the gage.	Apr. 30 14:05 Start transferring highly radioactive water accumulated in the vertical part of the concrete tunnel outside the turbine BLDG to the waste processing facility	May 18 16:30 Examine the reactor BLDG prior to nitrogen injection		May 13 11:00 Water accumulated in the room for high pressure injection system discharged to other space.
	May 17 11:50 Volume of water injected was changed to 6 m3/h from 10 m3/h.	May 1 13:35 The work to block the vertical concrete tunnel outside the turbine bldg started.	May 20 14:15 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (increase)		May14 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
	May 20 15:06 Water injected to the SFP	May 2 12:58 Water feeding was temporally switched from to the reactor injection pump to the fire pump to install alarm device to the reactor injection pump.	May 20 17:39 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (increase)		

	May 22 15:33 Water injected to the SFP	May 6 09:36 Water injected to the SFP	May 23 11:31 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (decrease)		May15 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 7 09:22 Operation of discharging water accumulated in the concrete tunnel outside turbine bldgtto he waste processing facility temporally stopped while piping work for feeding water into the reactor being conducted	May 23 14:08 Volume of water through feed water line and fire extinguishing lineto No.3 Reactor changed (decrease)		
		May 10 13:09 Water injected the SFP conducted			May16 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 12 15:20 Operation of discharging water accumulated in the concrete tunnel outside turbine bldg to the waste processing facility temporally restarted,			
		May 14 13:00 Water injected to the SFP			May17 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 18 09:23 4 workers entered the reactor BLDG to measure radiation			May18 10:00 The operation of transferring water accumulated in Turbine bldg of unit-6 to the makeshift tank conducted.
		May 18 13:10 Hydrazine added freshwater was injected into the SFP at Unit 2 using concrete pump vehicle.			May 18 10:30 transferring water accumulated in the reactor bldg to the waste processing facility conducted
		May 22 13:02 Hydrazine added freshwater was injected into the SFP at Unit 2 using concrete pump vehicle.			
Major Data *1	Reactor Water level (June 3 11:00) (A) (Lower beyond lower end of the gauge , (B) -1600mm	Reactor Water level (June 3 11:00) (A) -1500mm, (B) -2100mm	Reactor Water level (June 3 11:00) (A) -1850mm, (B) -1950mm	Water temperature in SFP (May 07) 84℃	Water temperature of SFP Unit 5 41.9℃ (June 3 12:00) Unit 6 31.0℃ (June 3 12:00)
	Reactor pressure (June 3 11:00) (A) 0.578MPaG, (B) 1.568MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (June 3 11:00) (A) -0.016MPaG*2, (B) -0.016MPaG*2	Reactor pressure (June 3 11:00) (A) -0.138MPaG*2, (B) -0.115MPaG*2		
	CV pressure (June 3 11:00) 0.1289MPaabs	CV pressure (June 3 11:00) 0.030MPaabs	CV pressure (June 3 11:00) 0.1003MPaabs		
	RPV temperature (June 3 11:00) 111.6℃*2 at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (June 3 11:00) 110.2℃ at feed water line nozzle	RPV temperature (June 3 11:00) 131.9℃*2 at feed water line nozzle		
		Water temperature in SFP (June 3 11:00) 35℃	Water temperature in SFP (May 08) 62℃		
	Thermography (Apr. 26 23:00) CV: 25℃, SFP: 23℃	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) Top of R/B: 24℃	Thermography (Apr. 26 07:30) CV: 26℃, SFP: 56℃		

(2) Fukushima Dai-ni NPPs
All units are cold shutdown (Unit-1, 2, 4 have been recovered from a event falling under Article 15*)

3. State of Emergency Declaration
11th 19:03 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS)
12th 07:45 State of nuclear emergency was declared (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS)

4. Evacuation Order
11th 21:23 PM direction: for the residents within 3km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate, within 10km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house
12th 05:44 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate
12th 17:39 PM direction: for the residents within 10km radius from Fukushima II to evacuate
12th 18:25 PM direction: for the residents within 20km radius from Fukushima I to evacuate
15th 11:06 PM direction: for the residents within 20-30km radius from Fukushima I to stay in-house
25th Governmental advise: for the residents within 20-30 km radius from Fukushima I to voluntarily evacuate

Abbreviations:
SFP: Spent Fuel Storage Pool
EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator
RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel
R/B: Reactor Building
RHR: Residual Heat Removal system
CST: Condensate water Storage Tank
T/B: Turbine Building

*1 Trend data of primary parameters are available at Japan Nuclear Technology Institute's Home Page; "http://www.gengikyo.jp/english/shokai/special_4.html".
*2 Data trend is continuously monitored.