CHAPTER 13
The Ultimate Issue--
Conversion Or Ecocide
Whether the issue be consumer products --
adulterated, falsely labeled, or unlabeled, with respect
to potential or known toxic materials -- or major
technological projects, spewing long-persistent toxic
pollutants into the environment, the ultimate issues are
a livable environment, good health, and a decent quality
of human life. That a considerable segment of our
industrial-manufacturing-technological activities is
seriously uncoupled from these goals is a truism.
Many are hopeful that by pleading, by exposure, by
legal harassment, by public education, and by dedication
in the public interest, we shall be able to turn all of
this around, and thereby have technology finally begin
to serve societal needs and goals. But we might, through
focus on details of the injustices and reprisals, indeed
win important battles, but lose the war to prevent
ecocide. Is there some central theme that underlies all
these problem areas, with features that militate
strongly against local, isolated solutions?
We know the shortsighted parochial view of our
economics, which fails totally to consider the health
costs to society and the environment's deterioration.
We know the futility to date of the efforts to
alleviate these burdens upon our health and future
through governmental regulatory bodies. At best, this
has produced no real relief, and is not likely to do so.
We know that the technologist or scientist who
speaks out from an industrial or governmental position
will certainly meet reprisals, censorship, and, most
likely, unemployment.
Why don't we face squarely the real root of all our
problems and ask ourselves whether a realistic,
non-utopian solution is possible?
The Promotional-Profit Incentive
Our society is based upon the premise that
initiative, innovation, and promotion, all leading to
economic profit, will by their very nature insure the
delivery of goods and services that will steadily
upgrade the quality of life for the greatest number. The
present environmental crisis clearly indicates that such
a desirable result is anything but automatic. The
threats posed by food adulteration, poisonous chemicals
of agriculture and commerce, and radioactivity may, by
synergistic activity, guarantee ecocide, with little or
no opportunity for us to understand the hazard or to
take remedial measures. Indeed, a quest for remedial
measures for specific abuses may divert us from
effective, broad action.
We do not think it is particularly meritorious to
question the promotional or profit incentive. They are
deeply ingrained powerful human motivations. Moreover,
it appears that societies which have ostensibly eschewed
the profit motive seem as capable of misdirecting
technology as we are. And it may well be that desirable
innovation should be abundantly encouraged. There is no
doubt that skill and inventiveness should enable
technology to operate in society's behalf and to provide
many desirable and essential innovations, especially
until a rational solution to our population problem is
found -- some time off at best.
No fundamental law exists, so far as we know, which
dictates that a profit-oriented society must necessarily
engage in anti-societal, eco-destructive pursuits. No
fundamental law says it is impossible to make money
doing worthwhile things. We may well exhort industry and
technology to develop a sense of public interest
responsibility, even to pinpoint the fact that a
parochial view of their interests will destroy them
along with the rest of society.
Such exhortations are justified, carry a real ring
of morality, and are by no means scaremongering or
doomsday prophecies. It seems to us that they will fail,
however, because they don't address the real problem. It
is one thing to point out wrong directions; quite
another to provide a realistic framework for effective
solutions.
To come up with such solutions we must understand
some powerful factors which characterize innovative,
profit-oriented enterprise:
(1) The investment of capital by the
entrepreneur-innovator. Today innovation and technology
are very big business, most endeavors of any consequence
encompassing in a short while the effort to distribute
goods or services of the particular technology to 200
million people nationally, and to even larger numbers
when foreign outlets are considered. Even the early
investment is generally very large. If the particular
technological entrepreneurial project has gone along for
a period of time, the investment of capital funds soon
becomes huge, and indeed a matter of considerable
importance concerning which the entrepreneur must be
extremely protective. It is a characteristic of
innovation that there must be initial enthusiasm and
promise -- and this characteristic makes it very
difficult to appreciate the adverse by-product effects,
such as hazard to life. Two features operate here:
(a) The subconscious desire to look the other way
for an innovation that holds promise of real utility and
profitability.
(b) The widespread delusion that science and
technology will undoubtedly provide a "fix" for any
hazard of the enterprise.
(2) The investment of career by a large body of
scientists and technologists who prepare themselves at
great cost for the particular enterprise. And if the
technology has persisted for any length of time, such
men have achieved position, prestige, and a high
personal economic stake in the future of the enterprise.
A case in point is the nuclear energy technology.
Whole university departments have devoted themselves to
the training of nuclear engineers and related
technologists. And beyond the educational level, there
are thousands of nuclear engineers, health physicists,
and biomedical scientists with well-established careers
predicated upon the continuation and growth of nuclear
energy technology, in particular nuclear electricity
generation. And this doesn't begin to take into account
some 140,000 atomic industrial workers with a large
stake in the continuation and growth of this industry.
Indeed, the governmental regulators themselves have a
not inconsiderable stake in the nuclear energy
enterprise.
(3) The investment of ego and prestige by the elite
who have thoroughly committed themselves to the glowing
promises of the technology, in full public view. Again,
the longer the enterprise has persisted before adverse
features become evident the greater the ego-prestige
commitment of such elite, and the more difficult it
becomes for such elite to reverse their positions.
In nuclear energy, can any fail to understand the
difficult position of Chairman Glenn Seaborg who has
admitted his position as a prime salesman for nuclear
electricity generation? From a myriad of platforms, and
in countless printed statements, he has stated that "the
atom came to us in the nick of time." Is anyone so naive
as to fail to understand why Dr. Seaborg is having
difficulty facing the realization that the hazard of
ionizing radiation is far greater -- 20 to 30 times
greater than was thought a decade ago? Or to fail to
understand why Dr. Seaborg dodges the question of the
likelihood of a catastrophic accident at a nuclear power
plant? Or to fail to understand why Congressman Chet
Holifield, having pushed appropriations of billions for
nuclear energy development through Congress, clings to
the concept of a "safe" amount of radiation exposure --
a concept rejected by a whole series of distinguished
scientists, as well as all the scientific bodies
involved in study of radiation hazards?
It should be unrealistic for any of us to hope that
dangerously misguided technological-industrial endeavors
will come to an end through:
* Economic suicide of the capital-investing
entrepreneur,
* Career and job suicide of the technologists and
workers,
* Ego and prestige suicide by leaders, promoters, or
apologists for the enterprise.
To argue that a higher morality should guide all
these men, with their varied, vested interests, is
simply to produce a totally unreal and unuseful image of
men. It is obvious that long-range ecocide will
necessarily win out over short-range, parochial economic
suicide, career-suicide, or ego, prestige-suicide. And
morality won't even visibly enter into the
consideration, for the mechanisms of rationalization
will surface in abundance to protect against even the
most obviously indefensible position.
Limited Victories
Some may point out that, in spite of all the above,
we can win the battle in the existing framework. The
battles, yes; the war, no. Cyclamates, it will be
argued, have been withdrawn from the market in spite of
vested producer interests, in spite of shenanigans of
the most reprehensible character from the Food and Drug
Administration. But for every cyclamate withdrawn, there
are hundreds or thousands of compounds in the food
additive field that haven't even been evaluated for
toxicity in any meaningful manner -- and are not likely
to be so investigated. Need we point out the uphill
battle to introduce rationality into the
pesticide-agriculture scene, including the questionable
antics of the Agriculture Department and State
Legislatures throughout the country?
Need we point out the charade of the National
Academy of Sciences appointing primarily atomic
energy-supported scientists to re-investigate the
hazards of ionizing radiation -- men who have publicly
taken a position on the matter at the outset of their
supposed "study"? Suppose they do come out with
recommendations suggesting a slight tightening of
radiation standards. Is this a significant step forward
in avoiding atomic energy depredation of the environment
and of human heredity?
The creation of Centers for Adversary Assessment of
Technology can fill an important void -- can perhaps
provide the "other side of the picture" of the hazards
and secondary effects of technology at an early phase,
before too much economic and ego commitment has occurred
for a particular enterprise. Such adversary assessment
is an absolute "must" for on-going and proposed
technologies. It would be required for any proposed
solution, since the "other side of the picture" is an
absolute necessity. But unless additional steps are
taken, the information developed by the adversaries will
be arrayed against very powerful vested interests in all
of the areas we've discussed. There is an additional
element needed, ultimately, for the adversary activity
to function effectively. And that element is conversion,
in its broadest sense.
Conversion
Industrial conversion from manufacture of war
materiel is receiving serious consideration. Obviously,
it is highly desirable to encourage industry to
cooperate in devising procedures that will make it
acceptable not to push and lobby for unnecessary,
destructive military expenditures. But this is far, far
from enough. We must view conversion much more broadly
and be prepared to encompass all types of
industrial-technological endeavor -- wherever it becomes
evident that anti-societal goals are being pursued, no
matter how innocently.
The fundamental premise has to be that
industrial-technological endeavors directed toward
improvement of the quality of life are necessarily
preferable to those which contribute to ecocide. And a
second premise is that we must absolutely learn to
accomplish transition of anti-societal to pro-societal
endeavor soon.
* * * * *
Indemnification: At the economic-entrepreneurial
level, the necessary ingredient is indemnification
against loss of investment when technology assessment
dictates a change in direction. We would hardly be
impressed by those economists who would say this is
unrealistic, impractical, and unworkable. These same
economists have failed in the past to include the
secondary, and severe, costs to health and environment
in their balance sheet thinking about corporate
economics. If our suggestions remain unworkable or
impractical, it will be because the economists fail to
accept a major challenge which faces them to work out
details that will be workable. The ultimate in economic
stupidity is the degradation and destruction of life.
In at least two major areas the industrial
entrepreneurs arrived at the position they are now in
through public and governmental urging. We are not
unmindful of complicity by the entrepreneurial lobbies
in creating the governmental "urging." Nevertheless it
is clear that the public and government did support the
cold war concept and did, thereby, help create the vast
military industry. Another illustration is in the field
of atomic energy. There is little doubt that the
Congress and the Atomic Energy Commission worked hard to
"sell" industry on the wonders of the peaceful atom,
especially the wonder of nuclear electric power
production.
Why would it not be proper to indemnify industry
investors against capital loss required by a change in
direction? Indeed, a failure to do this may well make it
harder in the future to get industry to participate in
governmental sponsored areas, some of which, at least,
may be quite worthwhile. A punitive approach to
investors in technologies which prove to be unwise can
only be expected to meet with fierce resistance,
subterfuge, distortions, half-truths, and lies in the
effort to preserve parochial, short-term economic
interest, whatever the societal cost. Far better to meet
this problem by learning some economics of
indemnification.
* * * * * *
Preservation of Technologists' Positions: It is
equally obvious that we cannot afford the luxury of
unemployment or prospective unemployment for
technologists, or for the labor force which is involved
in their technology. For the first group, the
technologists (and scientists), the prospect of the
disappearance of their technology, their careers, their
positions is, perforce, terrifying. Therefore,
objectivity in their own assessment of their particular
technology is readily buried in a morass of
rationalizations and pseudo-science. The second group,
the labor force involved, provides an unfortunate lobby
to prevent public objective evaluation of the technology
and its hazards.
We must develop techniques to protect both groups
against unemployment and the fear of unemployment, if we
are to expect them to participate in a constructive
redirection of technology where required. Some
economists have a tunnel-visioned view of unemployment
as a useful tool in curbing inflation. Anachronistic and
inhumane though this be, the implication is far, far
more serious in a technology-based society. Obviously,
where position and total career loss threatens, the
technologists and the backup labor force will opt,
overtly and covertly, for continuation of an
anti-societal enterprise. And they will represent a
powerful force to preserve the enterprise by delaying
and confusing the hazard issues. Why should we stimulate
this behavior -- a behavior so human and expected?
We propose, therefore, when a technological
enterprise needs cessation or redirection, that the
technologists and labor force be guaranteed continued
employment in the redirection of their particular
technology. Again, the classical economist may argue
that the expense would be prohibitive. And our answer is
that failure to guarantee against position and economic
loss will be infinitely more costly for society.
Certainly the legal profession has learned very well
the difficulty of getting expert witnesses from within
technology to testify concerning hazards of their
technology. And they hope that somehow this wall of
silence can be broken so as to be able to carry forward
environmental lawsuits. Such hopes are, broadly,
destined to failure unless the fear motive is removed.
And that fear rests in economic and position losses, or
potential losses.
Moreover, it is manifestly ridiculous even to
consider unemployment for technologists and scientists
(actually for anyone, for that matter). There are indeed
many important tasks requiring all of our technological
skills and ingenuity. Why waste it? There is little
doubt that most technologists can readily be redirected
into new areas. The cost of those who perform poorly
during the redirection phase would be a small price to
pay for the tremendous gains achieved by stopping
eco-mad endeavors. And, further, technologists,
realizing that redirection would be expected in the
course of their careers, would be far less likely to
become overly limited in confining their expertise to
minutia of a specific technology.
* * * * *
Ego-Prestige Loss and Defensiveness: We all are
familiar with the expression that "nothing succeeds like
success." It seems like a homey little statement, until
one considers carefully some of the implications. And
this leads us directly to consider some extremely
important issues other than the economic ones in the
persistence of technological blunders.
We must ask ourselves seriously about the price of
failure, rather than success. As a culture, we place a
high ego-premium on being right about what we say, what
we do, for essentially all endeavors that are in the
public or semi-public domain. It is no secret that in
scientific academe some men appear to devote a lifetime
of research and publication to proving they were right
in their Ph.D. thesis. Who in industry or technology is
unaware of the hazard inherent in having to tell his
superior that all is not so rosy in the picture painted
last month or last year concerning a specific project?
Defensiveness is the obvious result of the high
value-premium we place upon success. And defensiveness
breeds tunnel-vision, self-deception, and
rationalization -- anything but objectivity. Why can't
we learn to honor and respect honest admission of error,
of failure? While this may require careful nurturing of
a subtlety in attitudes, we will fail to learn to change
our attitudes at great peril and cost.
Decisions to go forward in a technological
enterprise are not made by bureaus, nor are they made by
corporations. Decisions are made by men. It is, of
course, entirely appropriate to emphasize this in our
endeavor to impress upon men that they will be held
accountable for their decisions. This will certainly
help in making captains of industry, governmental
decision-makers, and technologists exercise more
sobriety than otherwise they might. But at the same time
we must absolutely refrain from squeezing men into an
escape-proof, irrational ego-box.
Responsibility, yes -- but only if we add sincere
appreciation and praise for the ability of a man to
admit forthrightly that he has changed his view, that
what once looked right, now looks foolish. We
desperately need to create an atmosphere where a man can
proudly admit error. In a vast majority of instances the
error is not the result of negligence, not the result of
deceit, not the result of irresponsibility. It is simply
the result of the great power of hindsight, especially
hindsight buttressed by new evidence and altered
circumstances. So, we had better see to it that
something else can succeed besides success.
Time Magazine (December 28, 1970) carried a short
article entitled "Heresy in Power." The title itself is
extremely revealing of our attitudes. Presented in the
article is the statement by Charles Luce, Chairman of
Consolidated Edison Corporation, that the idea of
promoting increased electric power use, representing the
wisdom of three years ago, is the "idiocy of today." Why
is that revised view of Mr. Luce regarded as "heresy?"
It is, rather, a profoundly important realization by a
leader of industry that his industry's position of
yesteryear is no longer compatible with the real world.
And, therefore, his statement deserves praise and
admiration. Are we broadly prepared to provide such
praise? Mr. Luce seems inordinately capable of learning
and forthrightly stating the new horizons opened up by
his self-education.
Thus, instead of the totally defensive attitude of
the electric utility advertisers and AEC officials who
whitewash the hazards of nuclear power generation
because of their commitment thereto, Mr. Luce suggests
the highly constructive idea of a tax on electricity
bills to provide funds for research and development of
new methods of electric power generation compatible with
the environment. Since Mr. Luce is thoroughly familiar
with nuclear power (his company participates in nuclear
power), we can surmise that he refuses to be brainwashed
concerning the absolute wonders of that approach to
power generation. How many men can escape the irrational
ego-box as well as Mr. Luce has? What reception will he
receive for his "heresy" among his electric power
colleagues?