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                                CHAPTER 41
         Some of the Uncertainties and Certainties of Our Finding

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   Part 1.  The Estimate of 75 %
   =============================

       The number of radiation-induced breast-cancer cases per year in
   the USA is estimated as 114,336 cases in the Master Table (sum of
   Column-W entries), not rounded-off.  This number is (114,336 /
   182,000), or 63 percent of the annual total incidence, if yearly
   production = yearly delivery.

       In showing every step of the estimate's derivation, we have
   pointed out several unavoidable uncertainties.  The uncertainties in
   the conversion-factors (Master Table, Column V) may operate in
   either direction --- either to make 63 % an underestimate or an
   overestimate.  On the other hand, Chapter 38 summarizes the many
   reasons, shown in both Sections 2 and 3 of this study, for saying
   that the average annual doses for the 1920-1960 period are seriously
   underestimated in the Master Table.  Among the reasons:  Complete
   OMISSION of some very important sources of breast-irradiation from
   the Master Table.  These omissions operate with certainty in the
   direction of making 63% an underestimate.

       In offering the most reasonable estimate that we can, we are not
   entitled just to ignore a certainty.  So we must adjust 63 % upward.
   We choose to make only a very modest increment, to 75 %.  This is
   the midpoint of the range from 50 % to 100 % --- a credible range in
   view of the evidence currently at hand.

       The "Law of Equality" (Chapters 4 and 5) does not tell us how
   many decades are required for build-up to equilibrium --- the
   situation when annual production of radiation-induced breast-cancer
   cases equals annual delivery in a population of all ages, due to a
   steady rate of person-rads per year.  No one can know, until the
   lifetime observation of infants and children is complete in the A-
   Bomb Study.

       But we can make a "first cut" estimate without knowing the exact
   number of years because we took the long view --- 1920 to about the
   year 2000 --- and because we probably have a fairly constant annual
   rate of person-rads before and after 1960 (see Chapter 5, Part 1).
   This is why we are confident that equilibrium (with respect to
   radiation) must be approaching soon.


   What If the Dose Was Really Twice What Is Evaluated in the Master Table?
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       We believe that our Master Table seriously underestimates the
   annual average breast-dose in the 1920-1960 period.  We believe that
   the true dose was probably at least twice the estimate in the Master
   Table from all sources combined, for the reasons discussed in
   Chapter 38 --- especially the omitted doses from fluoroscopy and
   from treatment of both skin and inflammatory conditions.

       Despite its probably large underestimate, the Master Table
   indicates that past radiation is responsible for about 63 % of the
   recent, current, and future breast-cancer problem in the USA.  If
   the annual average breast-dose, in person-rads, were really at least
   twice what we estimated, are we saying something absurd:  That MORE
   than 100 % of the breast-cancer problem is radiation-induced?

       Of course not.  100 % of a problem is "the max."

       If the annual average dose was at least twice what was estimated
   in the Master Table, would it mean that the estimated conversion-
   factors need reduction?  It might mean that.  And it might not.  It
   might mean that the number of new breast-cancer cases "delivered"
   per year is going to rise ABOVE 182,000, and that additional cases
   are going to be radiation-induced.  Even the inherited "destiny"
   cases may require help from radiation and other non-inherited
   factors, as discussed in Chapter 1, Part 5.

       This comment on the underestimation of dose, however, does not
   mean that we are "married" to any particular set of conversion-
   factors.  No matter who proposes conversion-factors, such factors
   necessarily combine real-world evidence with some assumptions.  If
   future evidence invalidates some of those assumptions, objective
   analysts will discard the assumptions without hesitation.

       This study uses a current set of reasonable conversion-factors
   --- and they are appropriate for the initial inquiry.  Still, we
   would like to point out (A) that these conversion-factors take no
   account of individuals who develop MORE than one radiation-induced
   breast-cancer, and (B) that the conversion-factors are lifetime
   factors which take no account of WHEN breast cancer occurs --- even
   though it makes a big difference to breast-cancer patients whether
   it occurs at age 30 or at age 80.  We regard this study as the
   beginning, not the end, of such inquiries.



   Part 2.  Some Intriguing Questions for Future Resolution
   ========================================================

       An underlying assumption in the Master Table is that
   conversion-factors remain valid in a population, decade after
   decade.  That is a reasonable assumption if all other carcinogenic
   forces remain constant.  With respect to breast-cancer, many of
   these other forces are not yet identified with certainty.

       No matter how high is the percentage for breast-cancer's
   radiation etiology, it is important to learn how other agents and
   events (e.g., childbirth) ALSO participate in breast-cancer
   development, as emphasized in Chapter 1, Part 5.  For instance,
   interaction of other agents and events with ionizing radiation may
   make matters worse, by permitting radiation-induced breast-cancers
   to appear earlier than they otherwise would.  Such information would
   be of great interest.

       The world is a long way from knowing how to quantify the net
   interaction of ionizing radiation with other carcinogens.  Indeed,
   we do not even know yet whether some of the non-radiation risk-
   factors for breast-cancer operate by inducing permanent genetic
   lesions, or by inappropriately turning critical genes off-or-on
   (without inflicting any permanent molecular injury), or by some
   other mechanism.  We do not know whether the non-radiation risk-
   factors require the presence of permanent radiation-induced lesions
   in order to have their effect --- or vice versa, with radiation-
   induced lesions requiring the presence of non-radiation factors ---
   or whether all these factors are independent of each other.  These
   are important and intriguing questions.


   Disappearance of the Excess Relative Risk
   -----------------------------------------

       Even if the factors act independently at the cellular level,
   there is the potential for severe confounding of studies by chronic
   exposure to a SINGLE agent, like ionizing radiation.  For example,
   suppose (for the sake of simplification) that ionizing radiation is
   the ONLY cause of breast-cancer.  And suppose that we do a study in
   which we carefully observe the A-bomb survivors (or female nuclear
   workers, etc.) to compute the percent increase in the apparent
   "spontaneous rate" of breast-cancer per rad over full lifespans.

       If we fail to take into account that the apparent "spontaneous"
   rate is rising equally both in the comparison-groups AND in the
   matched control-groups, due to equal amounts of MEDICAL irradiation,
   we are going to underestimate the Excess Relative Risk per rad
   (Chapter 3, Part 3).  In fact, one implication of the "Law of
   Equality" is that exposure of a stable population to a constant
   level of ionizing radiation would --- at equilibrium --- cause no
   INCREASE per rad in the apparent "spontaneous" rate, even if
   radiation were causing 100 % of the problem.


   Another Potential Pitfall in Studies of Cancer-Causation
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       It is well worth noting that, among risk-factors for breast-
   cancer, not all have been studied with respect to the full lifespan
   of women.  We do not doubt the validity of observations which
   correlate the presence of various non-radiation risk-factors with
   elevated rates of breast-cancer, and conversely, correlate their
   absence with reduced rates of breast-cancer.  But we regard the
   "lift-off" phenomenon described in Chapter 3 (Part 4) as a potential
   pitfall in non-lifespan studies.

   [the figure referred to on the next line can be found at:
    http://www.ratical.org/radiation/CNR/images/PBCchp41.gif
    --ratitor]
       The figure on the next page depicts three curves under which the
   lifetime area is NOT very different.  Suppose the middle curve
   depicts the age-specific breast-cancer rate, for which we use an
   arbitrary scale.  Suppose (for simplification) that the middle curve
   is due exclusively to ionizing radiation.

       Next, let us suppose that presence of some additional factor
   shifts the middle curve just SLIGHTLY to the left (to earlier ages,
   so we can call it the "lead" curve). Investigators will observe some
   BIG differences in rates as the two curves "lift-off" at slightly
   different ages from the baseline of zero.  It is easy to observe
   10-fold, 4-fold, and 100 % increases over several years of study.
   Nonetheless, the factor causing the big increases does not have much
   more area under its lifetime "lead" curve than the area under the
   middle curve, due to radiation alone.  In this illustration, a
   failure to have lifetime data on the non-radiation factor could
   result in erroneous assumptions about its real, lifetime impact.

       Lastly, let us suppose that presence of some additional factor
   shifts the middle curve just SLIGHTLY to the right (to older ages,
   so we can call it the "lag" curve).  Investigators will observe some
   BIG differences in rates as the two curves "lift-off" at slightly
   different ages from the baseline of zero.  Nonetheless, the factor
   causing the big "protection" does not have much less area under its
   lifetime "lag" curve than the area under the middle curve, due to
   radiation alone.  In this illustration, a failure to have lifetime
   data on the non-radiation factor could lead to erroneous assumptions
   about its real, lifetime impact.

       For ionizing radiation, the Atomic Bomb Study evaluates the
   LIFETIME carcinogenic effect of exposure upon its participants, with
   completion approaching even for the youngest ages at exposure.  We
   can not overemphasize the unique value of the A-Bomb Study, and the
   importance of maintaining a single continuous set of cohorts until
   the study is complete.


   Importance of Exact Age-Matching in Epidemiologic Cancer-Studies
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       The "Lead-Lag" Curves illustrate another potential pitfall in
   epidemiologic cancer-studies.  Suppose we are doing a prospective
   study to learn if an X-type-diet (or pharmaceutical, or whatever)
   has any effect on the rate of breast-cancer.  And suppose that the
   experimental group on an X-type-diet and the control group are quite
   well matched --- except that the Diet-X group is older by just a few
   years.  All three curves in the figure reflect the fact that, after
   "lift-off," a few additional YEARS mean an appreciable increase in
   cancer-rate, when the curves are steep.  A difference of two years
   in age can mean a difference in rates which is NOT negligible.

       So the figure illustrates why epidemiologic studies simply can
   not ignore small differences in age.  In the Diet-X Study, if we
   observe a higher rate of breast-cancer in the Diet-X women, we had
   better pay close attention to the small difference in AGE.  It might
   explain everything.



   Part 3.  The Key Certainties about Our Finding
   ==============================================

       In this chapter and in earlier ones, we have pointed to various
   approximations and uncertainties in our study.  Now, it is time to
   summarize some of the underlying certainties.

       * - (a)  Radiation is a proven cause of breast-cancer.

       We stated at the outset (Chapter 1) that causation of extra
   breast-cancer by ionizing radiation is proven --- it is not a
   speculation.  And in this book's Reference list, we flag (with # )
   some of the papers which present the evidence of causation and
   quantify the risk from various studies.  With respect to irradiated
   groups, "risk" does not mean "maybe" --- it means the observed RATE
   of radiation-induced breast-cancer.

       * - (b)  Latency varies by decades for people irradiated at the
   same age.

       This is another observation which is not in doubt (Chapter 2).
   In order to evaluate the contribution of radiation to recent,
   current, and future breast-cancer incidence, we must include
   radiation exposures which occurred decades earlier.

       * - (c)  Breast-irradiation received by females during infancy
   and childhood increases their rate of breast-cancer in adulthood.

       The evidence for this is clear, now (Chapter 3).  The increase
   shows up first in extra cases of EARLY-onset breast-cancer, and the
   increased rate continues for at LEAST 40 years after the exposure.

       * - (d)  The radiation response per rad is the most severe for
   irradiation at the youngest ages.

       Comparisons between different ages at irradiation are made
   meaningful on the basis of the LIFETIME response.  The comparisons
   necessarily incorporate approximations for the younger age-groups,
   because their lifetime follow-up is not yet complete in the A-Bomb
   Study.  Over the past twenty years, comparisons have become
   increasingly reliable, as observations of the younger groups
   gradually replace approximations.

       Is it reasonable to regard the elevated sensitivity of the young
   as a certainty?

       In the Tokunaga Study --- specifically of BREAST-cancer
   incidence in the A-Bomb Study for 1950-1985 --- the analysts have
   presented Excess Relative Risks per sievert for six age-groups (age
   at the time of the bombings).  At 40 years post-bombing, they report
   that the Excess Relative Risk is 10-fold higher for age-years 0-9
   than for age-years 50+ (Tokunaga 1994, Table 6, p.215).

       What is the estimated LIFETIME ratio in our independent
   conversion-factors?  It is (92.74 / 24.56), or only 3.78.  The ratio
   would have been 7.55-fold if we had not slashed the conversion-
   factor in HALF for the 0-9 year-olds (see Chapter 40, Box 6, Column
   R).  We made this downward adjustment because we know that the
   interim observations are affected by the "lift-off" factor.
   Therefore, the interim observations must decline somewhat by the end
   of the LIFETIME follow-up.

       With the difference in age-sensitivity still as large as 10-fold
   or 7.5-fold, it is extremely unlikely that the sensitivity will
   completely disappear.  We can classify the special sensitivity of
   the young as a certainty, with respect to radiation-induced breast-
   cancer.

       * - (e)  Breast-cancer is more easily induced by ionizing
   radiation than cancer at other sites.

       This observation is discussed in Chapter 40, in the text for Box
   6.  The observation comes from the 1994 Thompson Study of cancer
   incidence (all sites) in the A-Bomb Study, 1958-1987.  Breast-cancer
   shows by far the highest Excess Relative Risk per sievert in the
   study.  By comparison with all cancer-sites combined, breast-cancer
   is 2.524-fold more inducible per unit of radiation.

       * - (f)  There is no safe dose (risk-free dose) of ionizing
   radiation.

       This observation was mentioned in Chapter 5, Part 5, and will be
   further discussed in Chapter 42.

       * - We make a recommendation.

       We recommend that readers keep this short list of certainties in
   their minds.  The list will keep some responses to this book in
   perspective.



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